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INTRODUCTION 
"God bless Mommy. God bless Nanny. 
God, don't punish me because I'm black."1 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our rec-
ognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. 
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsi-
bilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity 
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms. 
To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 2 
Brown vs. Board of Education3 established more than the unconstitu-
tionality of the separate but equal doctrine in public education. Brown also 
gave the importance of education a constitutional dimension. Involuntary 
racial segregation creates a stigma wherever it exists which indisputably 
affects a child's self-esteem and standing as an equal citizen. Yet, as 
NAACP strategists understood,4 the U.S. Supreme Court probably would 
not have dismantled Plessy v. Ferguson5 because Black children felt stigma-
tized by having to swim in separate pools or drink from separate water 
1. Sara's Prayer, in JoNATHAN KozoL, AMAzlNG GRAcE: THE LIVES OF CHILDREN 
AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 69 (1995). Sara, who is six years old, says this prayer 
every night before she goes to sleep. She lives with her adoptive mother, Charlayne, and 
her five year old brother in the South Bronx. Charlayne was friends with Sara's biological 
mother, who became addicted to crack cocaine during her pregnancy with Sara. Sara was 
also addicted to crack at birth and still suffers the consequences of her addiction. !d. at 65-
66. 
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
3. 347 u.s. 483. 
4. See generally MARK V. TusHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEG-
REGATED EDUCATION, 1925-50 (1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977). 
5. 163 u.s. 537 (1890) . 
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fountains.6 Although segregation in those contexts, as well as all the other 
areas covered by Jim Crow, promoted the social and political subordina-
tion of Blacks and concomitant feelings of inferiority, segregated education 
provided a unique type of harm. 
NAACP strategists also understood that integrating public schools was 
essential to achieving racial equality in America.7 While most Whites dis-
agreed about the value of integration in public schools, they agreed with 
most Blacks that education was important to all children, Black and White. 
This is suggested by the general consensus that Black children were entitled 
to an education even if they were separate from White children.8 This gen-
eral consensus among Whites and Blacks about the importance of educa-
tion to all children undoubtedly provided some legitimacy and impetus for 
the Brown Court's willingness to overrule Plessy in public education.9 
Brown also acknowledges qualitative aspects to the importance of ed-
ucation, which is evident from the Court's rejection of purely procedural 
definitions of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, 
~he Brown Court held that equality meant more than ensuring the State 
spend equal amounts of money on Black and White schools. Otherwise, 
there would have been no need to overrule Plessy on the question of 
whether segregation in public schools is constitutional; the Court could 
merely have ordered the state to spend more money on the Black 
schools.10 
6. Some of the schools for Black children did not have water fountains and the children 
drank from buckets with dippers. 
7. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 193. Focusing on school desegregation became the focus 
of the NAACP under the leadership of Charlie Houston in 1935. Mr. Houston stated the 
NAACP's view in announcing its new policy: "[Desegregation] conceives that in equalizing 
educational opportunities for Negroes it raises the whole standard of American citizenship, 
and stimulates white Americans as well as black." 1d. 
8. Michael W. McConnell, Originalisni and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 1005-06 (1995). 
9. By focusing on desegregating the public schools and relying on the importance of 
education to children as a rationale for its holding, the Brown Court weakened the moral 
underpinnings of its decision that would have enabled the Court to dismantle the separate 
but equal doctrine in a more honest and possibly enduring way. See McConnell, supra note 
8, at 1137-39 (suggesting that the focus on the importance of education and the reliance on 
psychological data as evidence of the harm segregation causes Black children, created a 
dilemma for Court when it wanted to end segregation in other areas). 
10. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court held that a Black man had to be 
admitted to an all-White state law school because there was no "separate but equal" law 
school for him to attend. Although the state had created a Black law school in response to 
his suit, the Court held that it was not "equal" to the White school which offered a higher 
quality education with respect to its facilities, syllabus, and faculty, and enjoyed a better 
reputation in the legal community. !d. at 633-34. The Sweatt decision could be read as an 
indication that the Court was beginning to confront the distinction between procedural and 
substantive equality, although as a factual matter, the facilities of the separate schools were 
not equal. See also, Robert Allen Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An 
Inquiry Into the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L. J. 879 (1979) (suggesting that 
integration is essential to racial equality). 
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Further, the Court's decision in Brown implicitly foreclosed the possi-
bility of procedural definitions of equality that would have allowed Black 
children access to White schools merely to avoid the stigma of feeling infer-
ior by being excluded without also ensuring their integration within the 
school. Specifically, if Brown is read in conjunction with McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,11 decided four years earlier, 
it is clear that the Court understood equality was tied to quality in intangi-
ble ways that extended beyond the blatant existence of Jim Crow in public 
education.U The McLaurin Court held that a state may not segregate stu-
dents within a public school on the basis of race because isolating a Black 
graduate student from his White classmates interfered with "his ability to 
study, to engage in discussion, and exchange views with other students, and 
in general, to learn his profession."13 Involuntary racial segregation, even 
within an "integrated" public school, affects a child's ability to learn, jeop-
ardizing the overall quality of the child's education.14 Merely allowing 
Black children into the White schools as a procedural matter would not 
obviate this type of harm.15 
Some scholars have criticized Brown and its progeny for developing a 
concept of integration that calls for admitting Black students to White 
schools and otherwise expecting the Black students to assimilate to White 
culture.16 Assimilation, however, is dramatically at odds with the goal of 
racial equality, which is the heart of Brown's mandate. Thus, just as 
McLaurin and Brown together define integration to mean more than the 
mere physical presence of Black students in White schools, I want to clarify 
that I do not conceive of "integration" as a synonym for "assimilation." On 
the contrary, an integrated environment is one in which people of all races 
share equal power and have equal voices in shaping policies and making 
decisions about how the environment will be structuredY 
By rejecting possible procedural definitions of equality, the Brown 
Court gave substantive content to the equal protection guarantee under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Consistent with McLaurin, the Brown Court en-
visioned full integration of Black and White students in the curriculum and 
everyday activities. Brown is premised on the principles that educational 
equality is essential to achieving racial equality, that a quality education for 
children of all races is essential to educational equality, and that racial inte-
gration in public schools is essential to providing a quality education. Thus, 
11. 339 u.s. 637 (1950). 
12. !d. at 641-42. 
13. !d. at 641. 
14. Id. The Court recognized that appellant's teaching skills and performance would 
be adversely affected by segregation from his classmates. 
15. !d. at 641-42. 
16. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why 
lntegrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 1401 (1993). 
17. For further discussion of this point, see Sharon E . Rush, Beyond Admissions: Ra-
cial Equality in Law Schools, 49 U. FLA. L. REv. _ (1997) (forthcoming). 
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the Brown Court was only willing to abolish segregation in public schools 
because a quality education is important to every child. In addition to pro-
tecting and promoting racial equality by its holding, the Brown Court was 
also making a profound statement about the importance of a quality educa-
tion to a child's welfare. Certainly, both principles were essential to the 
case. 
Unfortunately, more recent cases that raise questions about the right 
to a public education seem less willing to acknowledge the importance of 
education and the importance of integration in public education. Since 
Brown, the Court has held repeatedly that education is not a fundamental 
right.18 Ironically, the educational equality aspect of Brown seems to be 
diminishing in importance in cases quite similar to it-cases where the chil-
dren being denied equal educational opportunities are disproportionately 
children of color and poor children. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Missouri v. Jenkins19 sends the resounding message that inte-
grating public schools is no longer a priority. Jenkins and the other post-
Brown decisions seriously undermine our commitment to both racial equal-
ity and educational equality as announced in Brown. 
As I read Daniel Goleman's book, Emotional Intelligence,2° I thought 
about the importance of emotional intelligence in the education of our chil-
dren. I also thought about liow Goleman could have been one of the psy-
chological experts for the petitioners in Brown, helping to present evidence 
that a policy of involuntary segregation harms students by emotionally as-
saulting their hearts and by socially, economically, and politically isolating 
them from the power structure dominated by White America.21 Simultane-
ously, I thought about how heavily criticized the Brown Court was for rely-
ing-at least, ostensibly22-on such "soft" scientific research to reach the 
profound conclusion that separate is inherently unequat23 This criticism 
18. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988); Martinez v. Bynum, 
461 U.S. 321 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
19. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995) (holding constitutional equal per pupil expenditures for 
White and Black students in de facto segregated schools); see also infra Part LB. 
20. DANIEL GoLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MoRE 
THAN IQ (1995). 
21. The Brown Court focused on the harm segregation causes Black children. Segrega-
tion also harms White children who do not learn about cultural and racial diversity or prin-
ciples of human equality. Indeed, segregation indoctrinates White children in the 
inlportance of White supremacy and racial hatred, which angers people of color even more. 
Through state sponsored racial segregation, White children are involuntarily called on to 
participate in protecting and promoting institutional racism. 
22. Kevin Brown, A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial Realists Forced to Embrace the 
Legal Rationale of the Liberal and Integrationist Structure?, 20 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 783 
(1993). 
23. Admittedly, it would have made for a stronger case, as a matter of constitutional 
law, if the Brown Court had relied on equality principles alone to strike down segregation. 
At the time, however, the Court may have been uncertain of the consequences of taking this 
path. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1135-38. 
6 REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. :XXIII:l 
has been so extreme that in Jenkins, Justice Thomas argued that racial clas-
sifications are constitutional only if they serve compelling state interests 
regardless of any evidence from "questionable social science research" that 
a classification harms or does not harm a particular racial group.24 
However "soft" the evidence was at the time of Brown that children, 
especially Black children, are demoralized by racist policies like de jure 
school segregation, recent data support similar findings, including that in-
voluntary de facto segregation also harms children.25 Still, some people 
continue to be skeptical about the validity of psychological data and this 
skepticism may affect their opinions about the usefulness of a concept like 
emotional intelligence. Even for these skeptics, however, Goleman's book 
can be seen as offering further support for the moral principles that almost 
everyone now agrees are at the heart of Brown: that involuntary racial seg-
regation (de jure and de facto )26 is inconsistent with equality principles and 
is harmful to children, especially children of color, and that education is 
vitally important to children. 
As a White law professor and mother of a Black little girl, I am partic-
ularly inspired by the concept of emotional intelligence as it relates to re-
viving the principle in Brown that a quality education is essential to the 
equality concept embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Without edu-
cational equality, racial equality is an empty promise.27 
Part I of this article briefly presents several major U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions since Brown that raise the issue of the importance of educational 
24. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that no definitive link 
exists between de facto segregation and an inferior education so as to warrant a constitu-
tional remedy); see also infra Part I.B. 
25. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 
1186-1217 (1995) (exploring social science and psychology research that shows categorizing 
people into groups promotes stereotypes that can be negative and discriminatory). I think 
the equal protection clause of the Constitution supports the constitutionality of separate 
schools that are voluntarily created by minority groups, but this paper focuses on involun-
tary segregation. Moreover, some scholars suggest that segregation (as part of a separatist 
movement, for example) cannot be truly voluntary, given the social, economic, and political 
forces that promote White hegemony. See, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segre-
gation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School Segregation, SO MINN. L. REv. 
795, 808 (1996) ("[T]he issue really is whether such a 'choice' can be called voluntary if it 
results from a need to escape racism and racists."). 
26. In his concurrence in Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 214-
17 (1973), Justice Douglas recognized that the consequences of de jure and de facto segrega-
tion are equally pernicious. 
27. As others have pointed out, integrating schools alone will not end the institutional 
racism in our country. For example, efforts must also be made to end segregation in hous-
ing, especially since school populations are derived largely from the concept of neighbor-
hood schools. See Forum - In Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and 
Education, 80 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1996) (examining the connection between discrimination 
in housing and education and its effects on children). Moreover, even if racial equality 
could be achieved in education and housing, institutional racism would have to be elimi-
nated throughout society before racial equality is achieved. 
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equality, especially for students of color. The cases illustrate a waning 
commitment to racial and educational equality by denying that a quality 
education is important to children, by denying that all children are entitled 
to a free public education, and by denying the importance of racial integra-
tion in public schools. Part II describes major skills that are characteristic 
of people with high emotional intelligence and briefly relates the impor-
tance of those skills to developing a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
of racism. Specifically, it explores how emotional intelligence skills are rel-
evant to constitutional claims that children are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunities and attempts to demonstrate that employment of high 
emotional intelligence skills to the more recent cases would have promoted 
the values announced in Brown. Finally, Part III suggests specific ways we 
can renew our commitment to racial and educational equality by assuming 
leadership roles that promote these goals. 
My goal in this article is modest, but my message is urgent. I want to 
inspire a discussion · about emotional intelligence, integrated schools, and 
the connections between these two goals, especially with regard to promot-
ing racial equality and eliminating racism. I do not suggest that the concept 
of emotional intelligence is the antidote for all of society's ills or that 
school integration alone will dismantle White hegemony. What I do sug-
gest is that a "quality education," informed by Brown, is not possible with-
out integration. Education teaches more than math and verbal skills; it 
fosters emotional skills as well. Furthermore, a full set of emotional talents 
cannot be gained in the context of involuntary segregation. These insights 
into the connections between education and emotional intelligence can be 
helpful in understanding and healing racial divisions in our society, and in 
providing a means to eliminate some of the forces that contribute to social, 
economic, and racial inequality. 
I. 
THE GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH EDUCATIONAL AND 
RACIAL EQUALITY 
A. Beyond Desegregation: The Jurisprudence of Quality and Access 
Since Brown, the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases in-
volving questions about the meaning of Brown's desegregation mandate. 
Many of these cases have focused on busing issues and on how best to 
implement the goals of Brown.28 Another set of cases has addressed the 
28. See, e.g., Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), affd sub nom. 
Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958) (reaffirm-
ing the holding of Brown, 358 U.S. at 17, that desegregating the public schools was required 
for racial equality and that states could not "ingeniously or ingenuously" act to delay inte-
gration); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegre-
gation, 1955-70: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978). 
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issue of the importance of education outside the classic desegregation con-
text. This sub-set of post-Brown cases was brought by plaintiffs in two dif-
ferent situations. Some plaintiffs alleged they were denied what Brown 
arguably guaranteed to every child: a free public education of equal qual-
ity to the public education given to other children. Other plaintiffs alleged 
that they were disqualified from receiving a free public education because 
of unconstitutionally imposed eligibility requirements. 
1. Equal Education: Ignoring "Quality" 
The Court dealt first with the quality issue, which arose in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.29 In Rodriguez, the Court re-
fused to give heightened scrutiny to a Texas statutory scheme that pro-
duced disparities in school districts' per-pupil expenditures because they 
were based on property taxes. As a result of the financing scheme, poorer 
children (most of whom were Mexican-American) annually received $238 
less per pupil for their education than did wealthier children (most of 
whom were white).30 
Representing the state of Texas, Charles Alan Wright argued that fed-
eralism principles protected state and local governments' autonomy to de-
vise and administer their public school financing plansY When Justice 
Douglas asked Mr. Wright about the relevancy of the petitioners' race and 
ethnicity to the equal protection claim, Mr. Wright admitted that race was a 
factor in the case.32 However, he argued that any relationship between 
petitioners' wealth status and · their race or ethnicity was "merely 
happenstance. "33 
At least five Justices were persuaded by Mr. Wright's characterization 
of the irrelevancy of race and ethnicity in Rodriguez, which remarkably 
faded out of the picture.34 Building on the premises that poor people are 
not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right, the Court held 
29. 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
30. /d. at 12-13. 
31. Id. at 40. 
32. Charles Alan Wright, Oral Argument, in MAY IT PLEASE THE Cou RT 325 (Peter 
Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds. 1993). 
33. /d. ("Although it is of course quite true that in the Edgewood School District in 
Bexar County, Texas, the great majority of the students are of Spanish origin, and not as 
much money is spent there as in other school districts, [we doubt] that this would be found 
to be true as a general matter; ... that it is, in other words, a happenstance."). See also 
PETER IRONS, THE CouRAGE OF THEIR CoNVIcrioNs 288-89 (1988) (describing the course 
of the oral argument). 
34. Appellants asserted that the lower court had "ignored, quite properly, the claim of 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans." Appellants' Brief at 4, Rodriguez (No. 71-
1332). According to appellants, heightened scrutiny should not be applied to the school 
financing scheme because wealth is not a suspect classification. Id. at 29. The correlation 
between wealth and race was, once again, ignored. /d. at 9-38. This is consistent with the 
view held by many Hispanic scholars that Hispanics are largely invisible in American gov-
ernment and policy decisionmaking. See, e.g. , Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making 
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that the scheme merely had to be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. Expressing its concern about the impropriety of judicial intrusion 
into educational policy decision making, which is best left to local govern-
ments, the Court concluded that the plan "was not so irrational as to be 
invidiously discriminatory."35 The Court suggested that a scheme or law 
that totally denied some children a free public education, as opposed to the 
scheme at issue which ensured every child an education that taught them 
the basic minimal skills, might violate equal protection. 
The Rodriguez Court's failure to rely on the similarities between Rod-
riguez and Brown is odd. The cases are similar because they were brought 
on behalf of minority children in efforts to secure their rights to a free, 
quality public education. While Brown focused specifically on the rights of 
Black children, Rodriguez was a class-action brought on behalf of poor 
children and minority children, most of whom were Mexican-American. In 
fact, Mexican-American students comprised approximately 90% of the stu-
dent population in Texas' poorest school district, compared to approxi-
mately 18% of the student population in Texas' most affluent school 
district.36 Mexican-American children, like other children, are entitled to 
equal protection. 
Moreover, Rodriguez is like Brown because everyone involved in 
Brown knew that neighborhoods were segregated and that gross disparities 
existed in school expenditures for Black and White pupils.37 Perhaps the 
best descriptions of the differences which existed between Black and White 
schools is written by Richard Kluger in his book, Simple Justice. The fol-
lowing passage describes the results of a field investigation of the schools in 
Clarendon, South Carolina, which was done in preparation for a suit 
Thurgood Marshall was bringing on behalf of the NAACP: 
The total value of the buildings, grounds, and furnishings of the 
two white schools that accommodated 276 children was four times 
as high as the total for the three Negro schools that accommo-
dated a total of 808 students. The white schools were constructed 
of brick and stucco; the colored schools were all wooden. At the 
white elementary school, there was one teacher for each 28 chil-
dren; at the colored schools, there was one teacher for each 47 
children ... Besides the courses offered at both schools, the curric-
ulum at the white high school included biology, typing, and book-
keeping; at the black high schools, only agriculture and home 
economics were offered. There was no running water at one of 
of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965 (1995) (examining how Latinos are made "invisi-
ble" in certain contexts); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Polit-
ical Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1139 (discussing the inability of noncitizens to affect change in immigration laws). 
35. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. 
36. !d. at 25 n.60. 
37. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 764. 
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the two outlying colored grade schools and no electricity at the 
other one. There were indoor flush toilets at both white schools 
but no flush toilets, indoors or outdoors, at any of the Negro 
schools-only outhouses ... 38 
The report continued and pointed out that the Black schools did not have 
drinking fountains and that the Black children had to get water from buck-
ets with dippers; that Black children had no bus tran~portation to school; 
that Black schools had no lunchrooms or auditoriums; that the Black 
schools had no janitorial service because the parents were expected to 
clean the schools; and finally, at one Black school there were no desks for 
the children. Everything the Black students lacked, the White students 
were given.39 The plight of Black schools during Jim Crow was dramati-
cally characterized by poverty and racism. Thus, to move beyond Plessy 
and hold that de jure racial segregation in public schools is unconstitu-
tional, the Brown Court willingly ignored the disparities in expenditures 
between Black and White pupils and assumed they were equal. In contrast, 
the Rodriguez Court willingly ignored race to hold that a school financing 
scheme that results in disparities in per pupil expenditures is constitutional. 
In Rodriguez, where the litigants sought equality outside the context of 
integration, the primary focus shifted from race to wealth, even though the 
public schools involved were de facto involuntarily racially identifiable-
that is, separate and unequal. This shift is inconsistent with both the theo-
retical and factual underpinnings of Brown. 
While this shift reflects the strategic risk the Brown litigants faced in 
assuming equal per pupil expenditures, those involved in Brown probably 
did not realize the course they were charting and the ultimate dilemma 
they might face. This dilemma can be characterized as a hybrid Brown/ 
Rodriguez case, i.e., a case in which the plaintiffs are predominantly Black 
and poor, the per pupil expenditures really are equal (or better for Blacks), 
the schools remain involuntarily racially segregated because of economic 
demographics, and the students continue to suffer the harms associated 
with being politically isolated and excluded from White society's power 
structure.40 The dilemma posed by Brown and Rodriguez becomes dramat-
ically apparent in Jenkins. Ironically, by ignoring the race of the plaintiffs 
in Rodriguez, the Court may have inadvertently limited itself in Jenkins by 
having to choose either to acknowledge explicitly that a quality education is 
essential to the holding in Brown and integration of all races is essential to 
38. !d. at 332. 
39. !d. 
40. See john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 
MINN. L. REv. 749, 790-91 (1996) ("The demoralization experienced in urban, segregated 
schools is difficult to overcome, and more computers and books alone do not break down 
this feeling of abandonment."). Compare this with Goleman's concept of "emotional liter-
acy," arguing that teaching our children mere basic skills may not be enough to prepare 
them to survive in the modem world. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 231. 
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quality-issues the Court did not reach in Rodriguez-or, alternatively, to 
back away from Brown's goal of racial equality as promoted through inte-
gration of public schools. 
The risky route taken in Brown will have paid off only temporarily if 
the Court is unwilling to uphold the principles of racial and educational 
equality. Moreover, if the Court fails to promote the goal of integration of 
public schools, which is one possible reading of Jenkins, then Rodriguez 
provides some basis for an even greater abandonment of our commitment 
to children's education. In a world where wealth (or poverty) silently sub-
stitutes for race, and the relationship between the two is seen as "happen-
stance" and continues to be ignored, 41 separate and unequal will prevail. 
2. Equal Access: The Authority to "Disqualify" 
Within two years of Rodriguez, the Texas legislature passed a law 
seemingly designed to test the sincerity of the Court's dicta that a state has 
an obligation to provide an education, however slight, to its children.42 A 
class action suit brought on behalf of minority children and poor children 
presented the Court in Plyler v. Doe43 with the question whether a Texas · 
statute that denied free public education to children who had not been "le-
gally admitted" into the United States violated their equal protection.44 
Although the Court repeated its holding in Rodriguez that education is not 
a fundamental right45 , the Plyler Court nevertheless subjected the statute 
to intermediate scrutiny.46 Central to the Court's ruling that the statute 
violated equal protection was the Court's belief in the educational equality 
principle essential to Brown. Like all nine Justices in Brown, at least five 
Justices in Plyler upheld the principles of racial and educational equality: 
[Illiteracy] is an enduring disability. The inability to read and 
write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education 
each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that depri-
vation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological 
well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual 
achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile [a] status-based 
denial of basic education with the framework of equality embod-
ied in the Equal Protection Clause.47 
41. See supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text. 
42. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). 
43. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
44. ld. at 205. 
45. ld. at 223. 
46. "[C]ertain forms of legislative classifications, while not fatally invidious, nonethe-
less give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these linlited circumstances we have 
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the 
ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a sub-
stantial interest of the State." ld. at 217. 
47. ld. at 222 (footnote omitted). 
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This passage from Plyler echoes, with matching force, the sentiments of 
Brown presented at the beginning of this essay. 
The Plyler Court has been heavily criticized for overstepping its au-
thority and creating rights nowhere stated or implied in the Constitution.48 
As Professor Michael Perry wrote just after the decision: "The difficult 
question with respect to the Plyler decision, then, is not whether the Court 
gave the right answer. Of course it did ... The difficult question, rather, is 
whether it was right for the Court to give the answer. "49 Cases following 
Plyler, however, may put to rest the accusation that the Court is overstep-
ping its authority in this area. To the contrary; for many legal scholars and 
practitioners, these post-Plyler cases suggest that the Court has abdicated 
its responsibility under Brown to protect the equal protection rights of 
children. 
Martinez v. Bynum50 is typical of the post~Plyler jurisprudence. In this 
case, only the late Justice Marshall considered unconstitutional a Texas 
statute that disqualified eight-year-old Roberto Morales from receiving a 
free public education.51 Roberto's parents lived in Mexico, but sent him to 
live with his sister in McAllen, Texas, the place of his birth, so that he could 
receive an education. Unfortunately for Roberto, Texas denied a free edu-
cation to any child who lived in Texas for the sole purpose of receiving an 
education. Eight Justices upheld the statute as a bona fide residence re-
quirement that was rationally related to the state's interest in protecting its 
resources.52 Similarly, when nine-year-old Sarita Kadrmas and her 
younger siblings could not afford to pay a fee to ride on the bus to the 
public school 16 miles away, the Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public 
Schools53 upheld as rational the state's financing scheme that resulted in 
poorer families losing their bus subsidies.54 It is worth emphasizing that 
the statutes in both Martinez and Kadrmas had the intentional effect of 
potentially denying children like Roberto and Sarita a free public 
education. 55 
48. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1257 (1984) (re-
viewing VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER CouRT: THE CouNTER-REvOLUTION THAT 
WASN'T (1983), and suggesting that the majority opinion is devoid of either coherent or 
significant legal analysis and instead represents a piecemeal attempt at gaining consensus); 
Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Consti-
tutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 329, 329 
(1983) (insisting that the Plyler decision was "unmistakably and fundamentally activist in 
character"). 
49. Perry, supra note 48, at 344 (emphasis in original). 
50. 461 u.s. 321 (1983). 
51. Id. at 334. 
52. Id. at 333. 
53. 487 u.s. 450 (1988). 
54. Id. at 461. 
55. See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text, for a discussion of role of intent in 
proving race discrimination. 
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Together, Rodriguez, Martinez, and Kadrmas demonstrate a signifi-
cant retreat from our commitment as a nation to ensuring that all children 
receive a free quality education-a commitment that was at the heart of 
Brown. Why was it not relevant in Rodriguez, Plyler, and Martinez that the 
plaintiffs were of Mexican-American descent? Rodriguez and Plyler, after 
all, were class actions brought on behalf of minority and poor children, and 
the statute in Martinez seemed to be targeted at Mexican children residing 
in Texas. Ironically, Roberto was a United States citizen and had been 
born in the very town that had excluded him. The value of "citizenship" to 
minorities in our country's history has had enormous implications. In Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 56 Scott was denied citizenship (even though he was an 
emancipated slave) and thus denied access to the legal system. Remarka-
bly, even more than 100 years after the Supreme Court overruled Dred 
Scott in the Slaughter-House Cases,57 U.S. citizenship is not enough to se-
cure Roberto's right to a free public education.58 1t seems that an acknowl-
edgement of the plaintiffs' race and ethnicity would have triggered strict 
scrutiny and required an analysis in Rodriguez and Martinez forcing Texas 
to explain how its laws served compelling interests. A serious acknowl-
edgement of the plaintiffs' race and/or ethnicity in Plyler arguably would 
have put it beyond federalism's grasp and provided greater security to both 
the racial equality and educational equality principles of Brown. By failing 
to take the race/ethnicity road in Plyler, the Supreme Court invited legisla-
tion like that in California's Proposition 187, which denies free public edu-
cation to children like those in Plyler.59 Plyler, a five to four decision, 
could very well be reversed if Proposition 187 advocates have their day in 
court.60 
3. Equal Access: The Lack of Authority to "Disqualify" 
It is common for officials at colleges and universities to rely on stan-
dardized exams to determine which applicants are eligible for admission to 
their schools. Significantly, many standardized tests, including IQ tests, 
have been shown by credible studies to be biased against historically 
marginalized groups like African-Americans, Hispanics, women, and poor 
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 427 (1857). 
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 26, 60 (1873) (holding that the 14th Amendment explicitly 
granted "citizenship" to emancipated slaves). 
58. I am thankful to Carter Andersen for this observation. 
59. CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 48215 (Deering 1996) (Proposition 187, Section 7. Exclusion 
of Illegal Aliens from Public Elementary and Secondary Schools); CAL. EDuc. CoDE 
§ 66010.8 (Deering 1996) (Section 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Post-secondary 
Educational Institutions). 
60. Recently, the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
struck down section 7 of Proposition 187 (excluding illegal aliens from public elementary 
and secondary schools), relying partially on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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people, to list a few.61 In fact, the Supreme Court recently noted in United 
States v. Fordice62 that standardized tests can be used in unfair ways. 
Fordice arose in the context of plaintiffs who were students at predomi-
nantly Black universities in Mississippi. They alleged that Mississippi had 
failed to dismantle its dual university system for Black and White students 
in violation of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 63 
Historically, Mississippi used scores on the American College Testing 
Program (ACT) to determine eligibility for admission to its state universi-
ties and colleges. Eligibility for one of the four predominantly White insti-
tutions required an ACT score of 15 or higher.64 Both lower courts found 
the "discriminatory taint" of this requirement obvious, because when it was 
initially adopted in 1963, the average ACT score for Whites was 18 and for 
Blacks it was 7.65 State officials took advantage of the built-in racial and 
cultural biases of the ACT and set-cut-off scores for "automatic" admission 
to the White universities accordingly.66 As a practical matter, then, Black 
applicants were deemed "unqualified" for admissions to the predominantly 
White colleges and had no choice but to attend a predominantly Black 
college.67 
In 1985, the university system remained largely segregated.68 Admis-
sions officials continued to place determinative weight on ACT scores for 
admission to the predominantly White universities, knowing that 72% of 
Whites achieved this score, but less than 30% of Blacks did.69 The Court 
held that continued reliance solely on ACT scores to set automatic admis-
sions requirements was traceable to adoption of the original admissions 
policy. Because the automatic admissions policy still had segregative ef-
fects, the Fordice Court ordered admissions officials to look at other indicia 
of a student's ability to succeed.70 Specifically, the Court noted that plac-
ing more weight on students' grades would result in the admission of more 
Black students to the predominantly White colleges.71 Without actually 
61. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121, 
131 (1993) (citing STEVEN J. GouLD, MisMEASURE OF MAN (1981)). 
62. 505 u.s. 717 (1992). 
63. They also alleged violations of their Fifth, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights 
as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 723 (1992). 
64. Admission to Mississippi University for Women generally required an ACT score 
of 18. Id. at 734-35. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 734-35. 
68. Id. at 735 (noting that, at the time of the opinion (1992), Mississippi's universities 
remained "predominantly identifiable by race"). 
69. Id. at 735. 
70. Id. at 738. 
71. The Court relied on information provided by the American College Testing Pro-
gram, the organization that administers the ACT, which discourages reliance on ACT scores 
as the sole criterion for college admissions. 
1997) EDUCATION & RACE 15 
telling admissions officials that they must take grades into account, the 
Court nevertheless held that they must eliminate the use of standardized 
exams as the sole criterion for automatic admission. The state could not 
show "that the 'ACT-only' admission standard is not susceptible to elimi-
nation without eroding sound educational policy. "72 
Despite evidence that most standardized tests are biased, many people 
responsible for evaluating applicants for employment opportunities or edu-
cational programs continue to rely on them, sometimes accounting for the 
built-in biases and sometimes discounting them. The confusion over the 
appropriateness of relying on standardized tests to measure an applicant's 
qualifications for a particular state program is somewhat understandable 
because the Supreme Court itself is unclear about their role in equal pro- . 
tection analysis. Compare Fordice with the Court's analysis in Washington 
v. Davis73 where it found that the state did not discriminate against Black 
applicants by requiring that they obtain a certain minimum score on a stan-
dardized exam to qualify for police officer positions.74 Plaintiff's research 
revealed that Black applicants were four times more likely than White ap-
plicants to score below the minimum requirement.75 Because the state did 
not intend to discriminate against Black applicants by relying on the test 
scores to measure qualifications for the job, the Court found that disparate 
impact alone was insufficient to establish race discrimination.76 The Davis 
principle requiring proof of discriminatory intent, a nearly impossible task 
now that states are better at disguising racial discrimination, sanctions the 
use of standardized test scores that are knowingly biased against particular 
groups-usually people of color. 
A measure of intelligence that relies less on IQ-type tests and more on 
other indicia of ability to succeed minimizes the harm reliance on such tests 
causes individuals and groups of people who do not perform as well on 
them. In addition, such a measure of intelligence also offers hope that we, 
as a society, will not miss what Goleman calls "windows of opportunity"77 
for creating a more harmonious, productive, and democratic society. The 
situation in Fordice presented just such an opportunity and the Court rose 
to the challenge. Certainly, as the Fordice Court acknowledged, reliance 
The record ... indicated that the disparity between black and white students' high 
school grade averages was much narrower than the gap between their average 
ACT scores, thereby suggesting that an admissions formula which included grades 
would increase the number of black students eligible for automatic admission to all 
of Mississippi's public universities. 
!d. at 737. 
72. !d. at 738. 
73. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
74. !d. 
75. Id. at 237. 
76. !d. at 246. 
77. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 199. 
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on biased tests to evaluate an applicant is inconsistent with principles of 
equality and fairness. 
B. The Road to Involuntary Re-Segregation 
Cases like Rodriguez, Plyler, Martinez, and Kadrmas do not tell the 
whole story about the paling of Brown and our growing lack of commit-
ment to children and education, especially children of color and their edu-
cation. Helping to complete the picture are cases like Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke78 and Missouri v. Ienkins.79 Ironically, 
government efforts in both cases to promote the integration of public 
schools, one of which was a predominantly White medical school, and the 
other a predominantly Black school district, were struck down by the 
Supreme Court. These cases are important because they acknowledge race 
as a factor in the holdings, although in a way that is just as dramatically at 
odds with Brown as the cases that ignored race. Bakke and Jenkins explic-
itly quell the notion that racial equality matters in any significant way in 
analyzing the constitutionality of state laws that touch on issues at the in-
tersection of race, wealth, education, and equality. 
Moreover, it is appropriate to make a comparative analysis of these 
cases despite the fact that one involves a professional school and the other 
involves elementary and high schools. The Supreme Court continually fails 
to distinguish these two types of schools in its jurisprudence on education. 
For example, the bona fide residence requirement upheld in Martinez re-
lied on the precedent set in cases like Starns v. Malkerson80 where states 
charged higher tuition to out-of-state residents enrolled in state universities 
and colleges.81 One obvious and significant difference between the two 
types of schools is that a professional school is an optional choice for a 
student, while attendance in public schools through a certain age or grade 
level is required by state law. In fact, the Supreme Court itself acknowl-
edged the difference between voluntary and involuntary participation in a 
state program by holding in Bazemore v. Friday82 that a state did not have 
to integrate its 4-H program because participation in it was voluntary. 
By noting in Bazemore that one factor diluting the constitutional re-
quirement to integrate is that participation is voluntary, the Court implied 
that when participation is required by the state, the Constitution's equal 
protection guarantees are stronger. Yet, this distinction failed to carry the 
vote in Martinez which resulted in upholding a state law that totally ex-
cluded Roberto and other children from the public schools when other chil-
dren their age were required to be in school and could attend the public 
78. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
79. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). 
80. 401 U.S. 985 (1971), affg wlo op., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), cited in Marti-
nez, 461 U.S. at 328 n.6 (1983). 
81. !d. 
82. 478 u.s. 385 (1986). 
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schools for free. In other words, if anything, Bazemore would have sup-
ported constitutional protection of Roberto's right to an education in Mar-
tinez. Most importantly, when the issue is integrating historically White 
educational institutions, a comparative analysis of policies that promote in-
tegration at all levels seems more apt, if not entirely appropriate, because 
of the importance of education and racial equality in our society. In this 
way, Bazemore should not be extended to public educational institutions. 
]. Affirmative Integration Plans Rejected 
In Bakke, the Court held unconstitutional a U.C. Davis Medical 
School affirmative action admissions policy that set-aside 16 of 100 seats in 
the class for applicants who self-identified as African-American, Native 
American, Asian, or Chicano.83 Davis tried to justify its policy by asserting 
that members of the targeted groups were underrepresented in medical 
school and that their presence was essential to remedy past societal dis-
crimination, to provide a diverse environment, and to increase the number 
of doctors who were likely to provide services to patients within those 
groups.84 Allan Bakke, a White man, successfully persuaded the Court that 
the Davis plan was a form of reverse race discrimination and that it denied 
him, an innocent victim, equal protection.85 An essential element of 
Bakke's claim was that applicants of color who were admitted under the 
policy were less qualified than he. 86 
Recall that the Supreme Court's puzzling position in Fordice and Da-
vis on the constitutionality of using biased standardized exams as a means 
of assessing qualification. Bakke arguably only adds to the confusion. Al-
lan Bakke's central claim of reverse discrimination was the fact that his 
MCAT scores were higher than those of applicants admitted under the af-
firmative integration policy. 
The Bakke Court left open the question whether benign racial classifi-
cations, that is, classifications designed to help minorities, should be subject 
to strict scrutiny like other racial classifications.87 Underlying the Court's 
17 year struggle with this issue is the fundamental question whether the 
Constitution is color-blind as suggested by Justice Harlan in his dissenting 
opinion in Plessy.88 Although a majority of the Justices have not explicitly 
adopted Harlan's language89 (which arguably has been taken out of context 
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
84. Id. at 306. 
85. Id. at 310. 
86. ld. at 277 ("In both years [in which Mr. Bakke applied to the medical school], 
applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT 
scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's."). 
87. 438 U.S. at 294. 
88. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind."). 
89. Jenkins, 155 S.Ct. 2038, 2066. Justices who have adopted Justice Harlan's "color-
blind" language include Justice Thomas, concurring in Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2598 
(1994), denying relief to Black plaintiffs suing Beckly County, Georgia for federal Voting 
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in any event),90 the effect of the Bakke Court's holding, and more recently, 
the Court's holding in Adarand Canst., Inc. v. Pena that benign racial classi-
fications are to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, is consistent 
with Justice Harlan's philosophy.91 Recently, a federal court in Hopwood 
v. Texas invoked color-blind rhetoric92 and the strict scrutiny standard93 to 
hold that race may not be considered for purposes of creating diversity in a 
public law school.94 As Justice Blackmun stated in Bakke, "I suspect that it 
would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially 
neutral way and have it successful."95 
The snag in this debate is not the level of review applied to test the 
constitutionality of affirmative action policies. Rather, the problem lies in 
the Court's retreat from Brown's principle that the state has a compelling 
interest in providing a quality education to children of all races and ethnici-
ties. Integration is essential to achieve this goal. 
2. Brown Rejected? 
Missouri v. Jenkins,96 a classic desegregation case, seems to bring us 
full circle. The Jenkins Court faced the question whether the district court 
supervising a desegregation order had the authority, among other things, to 
Rights Act (1965) violations: "The assumptions upon which our vote dilution decisions 
have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind 
Constitution." Justice Stewart implicitly adopted the color-blind theme dissenting in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1979), which upheld federal programs that favored 
certain qualifying Minority Business Enterprises: "Under our Constitution, any official ac-
tion that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently 
suspect and presumptively invalid." 
Justices who have rejected this "color-blind" language include Chief Justice Burger, 
writing for the majority in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482: "As a threshold matter, we reject the 
contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fash-
ion"; and Justice Brennan, writing in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
355 (1978): "The position that [differences in color or creed] must be 'constitutionally an 
irrelevance,' Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring), 
summed up by the shorthand phrase '[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,' Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), has never been adopted by this Court as 
the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." See also infra note 91 and accompa-
nying text, for a discussion of how "color-blindness" has influenced decisions in education 
and public accommodation. 
90. T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 961 (positing that Justice 
Harlan's vision of a colorblind society was rooted in the general concept of the privileges 
associated with citizenship and not with the concept of equality embodied in the equal pro-
tection clause). 
91. Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995). 
92. 78 F.3d 932, 957 (5th Cir. 1996) (referring to a "race-blind" admissions system). 
93. !d. at 940. 
94. !d. at 944. 
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407. 
96. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995). For an illuminating analysis of Missouri v. Jenkins, see Brad-
ley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced 
Desegregation, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 597 (1996). 
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order that the state continue to fund quality education programs in the 
Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD). In the mid-1950s the en-
rollment of Black students in KCMSD was 18.9% and by the 1983-84 
school year, the Black population in the school district was 67.7%97• At 
least 24 schools in the district had Black student populations of over 90%, 
due primarily to "white-fiight"98 following the initial desegregation order.99 
As part of the desegregation order, the district court decided to create 
a magnet school plan to lure White students back into the district. Massive 
amounts of money (over $540 million) were ordered for capital improve-
ments100 and the per pupil expenditures in KCMSD were significantly 
greater under the plan than they were in neighboring districts.101 Despite 
all the expenditures, however, students in KCMSD continued to achieve 
scholastically "at or below national norms at many grade levels."102 This 
was the reason the district court ordered the quality education programs be 
continued. The Supreme Court held in a five to four vote that the district 
court exceeded its authority. Quoting from a previous desegregation case, 
Freeman v. Pitts103, the Jenkins Court repeated that the "ultimate inquiry is 
'whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in good faith with the 
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past 
discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."'104 Ac-
cordingly, the district court's job was to decide "whether the reduction in 
achievement by minority students attributable to prior de jure segregation 
has been remedied to the extent practicable."105 Because the district court 
failed to identify the correlation between the continuing segregation cou-
pled with low achievement test scores and the history of racial discrimina-
tion, it erred in assuming such a correlation existed.106 
Admittedly, Jenkins poses very difficult and complex questions ayd 
understandably, the state must be frustrated that it literally has poured mil-
lions and millions of dollars into improving the physical facilities and aca-
demic programs of the Black schools only to have the problem of racial 
segregation persist. In some ways, Jenkins vividly exposes the underlying 
strategy of the Brown litigation team: The litigation team knew that simply 
putting equal (even more) amounts of money into the Black students' 
97. 115 S.Ct. at 2062 {Thomas, J., concurring). 
98. Another example of drastic demographic shifts attributable to "white flight" is the 
changes in enrollment in the city of Boston's public schools between 1972 and 1995. In 
1972, 54,000 (or 60%) of the 90,000 students were white; but in 1995 only 11,340 (or 18%) of 
the 63,000 students were white. J. Anthony Lukas, The Need for a Tougher Kind of Hero-
ism, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996 at 48. 
99. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2063. 
100. Id. at 2044. 
101. Id. at 2054. 
102. ld. at 2055 (quoting the District Court). 
103. 503 u.s. 467 (1992). 
104. Jenkins , 115 S. Ct. at 2049. 
105. Id. at 2055. 
106. ld. at 2055. 
20 REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. XXIII:l 
schools was not enough to solve the moral and social dilemma of involun-
tary racial segregation. This is why they asked the Brown Court to assume 
procedural equality existed between the Black and White schools. Advo-
cates, members of Congress, 107 the Court, social science experts, and prob-
ably many other members of society knew and understood that more than 
procedural equality was needed to secure equal educational opportunities 
for Black children at the time of Brown. Given this, why are we surprised 
that efforts to equalize educational inequalities with money alone continue 
to be unsuccessful in dismantling the institutional racism that the separate 
but equal philosophy protects and promotes? 
All of these cases, especially Jenkins,108 are marked departures from 
Brown and reflect our waning commitment as a society to guaranteeing a 
free, quality public education to Black children, children of other colors, 
and poor children. If this pillar of Brown is removed, then the foundation 
that supports the importance of education also crumbles. If our commit-
ment to Black children wanes and eventually disappears behind the cloak 
of "race neutrality,"109 there is little hope that our commitment to all chil-
dren, including White children, children of other colors, and poor children 
will ever become firmly established. 
The retreat from Brown reflects the growing racial divisiveness in our 
country. Undoubtedly, there are many reasons for this growing divide. 
Rather than explore all those reasons, this paper attempts to offer some 
suggestions about how we can work together as a united people of different 
races to remove the barriers that keep us at a distance from each other. 
Consistent with this goal, Parts II and III explore the concept of emotional 
intelligence and suggest ways in which skills consistent with high emotional 
intelligence can help us begin to understand the dynamics of racism. They 
107. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1139. 
108. Since Jenkins (decided June 1995), efforts have been made to undo mandatory 
desegregation (by abandoning mandatory busing, ending court supervision of school deseg-
regation plans, or returning to neighborhood schools even if results would create involunta-
rily racially identifiable schools) in the state of Florida and in the following cities: 
Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, Louisville, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Wil-
mington. James S. Kunen, The End of Integration, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 38. 
As this article was in its final editing stage, four scholars at Harvard University pub-
lished a study that explore in great depth the resegregation of American public schools. See 
GARY 0RFIELD, MARK D . BACHMEIER, DAVID R. JAMES, AND TAMELA EITLE, DEEPENING 
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1997). 
109. Interestingly, Justice Harlan's "color-blind" language has been used to both sup-
port and weigh against the message of Brown. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1971) ("[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to 
control school assignment plans by directing that they be 'color blind'; that requirement, 
against the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board 
of Education.") with Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287-88 (1963) ("[The argument that the 
Constitution permits discrimination in public accommodation based on race] does not do 
justice to a Constitution which is color blind and to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education, which atfumed the right of all Americans to public equality".). See also supra 
note 89, for a list of Justices that favor and disfavor the color-blind rhetoric. 
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demonstrate the advantages of developing emotional intelligence skills, 
which can help us create the kind of environment where children of all 
colors can achieve success. The racial divisions in our society can only heal 
if our children are educated. 
II. 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, EDUCATION, AND RACE: 
EDUCATING OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN IN THE 
"ART OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS" 
"Being able to manage emotions in someone else is the core of 
the art of handling relationships.'mo 
A. Multiple Meanings of Intelligence 
We live in the era of the gene. Almost daily we hear or read about a 
new study being conducted to determine whether various traits and behav-
iors are caused by genetics. Some genetic research is aimed at finding cures 
for diseases, a goal whose value is difficult to dispute when curing people 
from diseases seems humane and caring. On the other hand, some genetic 
research seems to be undertaken, not to help people, but rather to absolve 
society from feeling obligated to help people.111 For example, in their pop-
ular book, The Bell Curve, authors Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray 
propose that African-Americans, as a group, are disproportionately at the 
lower end of the socio-economic scale because they are intellectually infer-
ior to Whites.112 The authors propose, among other things, that remedial 
education programs be discontinued presumably because they are wasted 
on people who have limited genetic capabilities for achieving academic suc-
cess.U3 Thisapparently irresistible drive to find genetic links to many phe-
nomenon-from criminal conduct114 to intelligence115 to sexual 
110. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 112. 
111. For a fuller explication of this point, see DoROTHY NELKIN & M. SusAN LINDEE, 
THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CuLTURAL IcoN (1995). 
112. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1995). 
113. Id. at 441-42. (Herrnstein and Murray suggest "[r]eallocat[ing] some portion of 
existing elementary and secondary school federal aid away from programs for the disadvan-
taged to programs for the gifted."). This should remind us of Arthur Jensen's suggestion 
that Head Start is a waste of time for Black children. 
114. See, e.g., Peter Maass, Conference on Genetics and Crime Gets Second Chance, 
WAsH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1995, at Bl (announcing the rescheduling of a conference called "The 
Meaning and Significance of Research on Genetics and Criminal Behavior" after a similar 
conference planned for 1992 was cancelled due to protest from scholars and civil rights 
activists); Richard W. Stevenson, Researchers See Gene Link to Violence, But Are Wary, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 29 (discussing researchers' finding of "tentative but growing 
evidence" of a genetic link to criminal and aggressive behavior); see also J. Clay Smith, Jr., 
The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 865, 875-78 (1994) (ex-
ploring the attempts to link violent behavior to genetic makeup). 
115. Last year, Rutgers University students attracted national attention during a pro-
test over remarks made by the University's president, Francis Lawrence, that Black students 
'' 
' j j 
.. ; 
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orientation116 and so on-seems to be growing at an alarming pace and not 
always with the best of intentions.U7 
One area in which tremendous reliance is placed on genetic makeup is 
in the area of intelligence, as exemplified by Herrnstein's and Murray's 
study. Scientists continually debate the question whether genes are the 
sole determinant of intelligence, or whether they play only a limited role in 
conjunction with environmental influences. Prominent IQ theorists sug-
gested as early as the 1920s that emotions were an important component of 
intelligence, but the idea of social intelligence never gained much credibil-
ity among scientists and psychologists in the earlier studies of intelli-
gence.U8 Until recently, a person's intellectual abilities have been assessed 
as a measure of the person's math and language skills, without regard to 
any other kinds of talents the person possesses. In the early 1980s, a 
Harvard University psychologist, Howard Gardner, introduced the concept 
of "multiple intelligences."119 As explained by Goleman, Gardner's initial 
studies identified five types of intelligence in addition to "the two standard 
academic kinds, verbal and mathematical-logical alacrity."120 They in-
cluded spatial capacity, kinesthetic genius, musical gifts, interpersonal 
skills, and "intrapsychic" capacity.121 As he continued to study multiple 
intelligences, Gardner's lists stretched to twenty, but, as Goleman explains, 
Gardner concluded that "there is no magic number to the multiplicity of 
human talents."122 
The concept of emotional intelligence builds on the idea of multiple 
intelligences and is distinct from intellectual intelligence, although no clear 
definition exists. Yale psychologists Peter Salovey and Robert Sternberg 
lacked the "genetic, hereditary background to have a higher [SAT score] average" than 750. 
Doreen Carvajal, Head of Rutgers Apologizes Again, N.Y. TrMEs, Feb. 9, 1995, at A1; see 
also Gary Younge, The Gene Genies, THE GuARDIAN, May 1, 1996, at T2 (profiling -scien-
tists trying to prove a link between race and genetic superiority including Roger Pearson, 
who has produced a vision of a "genetically-engineered master race," and Christopher 
Brand, who is currently seeking publication for his book, THE G FACTOR, GENERAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AND ITs IMPLICATIONs); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 209 (1995) (arguing that the value of the genetic tie varies in a way that promotes 
racist and patriarchal norms); Rachel E. Frshman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Creatures 
Deserve Constitutional Protection, 15 AM. J. L. & MEo. 461, 468-69 (1989) (expressing con-
cern that granting patents for genetic research may lead to the abuse of genetic selectivity). 
116. Sharon E. Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and 
Sexual Orientation, 13 HARv. BLACKLETIER L.J. _ (1997) (forthcoming). 
117. Natalie Angier, Study of Sex Orientation Doesn't Neatly Fit Mold, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 1993, at 24 ("In the sharp debate over the significance of recent work suggesting 
biological basis for sexual orientation, all sides are struggling to reconcile the new findings 
with their political ain1s and personal convictions."). 
118. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 42. 
119. Id. at 38. 
120. ld. 
121. Id. ("[T]he intrapsychic capacity could emerge. . .in the brilliant insights of 
Sigmund Freud, or, with less fanfare, in the inner contentment that arises from attuning 
one's life to be in keeping with one's true feelings."). 
122. ld. 
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have studied Gardner's ideas of multiple intelligences, focusing primarily 
on how a person's intelligences work together to help the person live a 
happy and productive life. Salovey and John Mayer, a psychologist at the 
University of New Hampshire,l23 introduced the concept of emotional in-
telligence and identified five types of abilities or skills it comprises. These 
include knowing one's emotions, managing emotions, recognizing emotions 
in others, handling relationships, and self-motivation.124 
In turn, Goleman describes emotional intelligence as a set of "abilities 
such as being able to motivate oneself and persist in the face of frustrations; 
to control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate one's moods and 
keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize, and to 
hope. "125 Goleman asserts that traditional measures of intellectual intelli-
gence, such as those studied in Herrstein's and Murray's The Bell Curve, 
account for only about 20 percent of the factors which predict how success-
ful a person will be in life.126 Measures such as IQ have such relatively low 
predictive value because they fail to take into consideration factors such as 
a person's ability to control emotions, handle frustrations, and get along 
with other people.127 Emotional intelligence factors, which Goleman lik-
ens to a person's character, may have a much greater impact on a person's 
ultimate success in life.128 
Goleman readily concedes that intelligence is a combination of both 
genetics and environmental factors. 129 He strongly believes that emotional 
intelligence skills can be learned.130 Psychologists already teach emotional 
intelligence to treat problems such as aggression or depression, but 
Goleman suggests emotional intelligence offers a "set of skills and under-
standings essential for every child."131 Some schools have special classes, 
called 'social development,' 'life skills,' or 'social and emotional under-
standing,' to teach children how to develop emotional intelligence skills.132 
123. Id. at 47. 
124. Id. at 43. 
125. Id. at 4. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 35. 
128. Id. at 36 ("[P]eople who are emotionally adept- who know and manage their own 
feelings well, and who read and deal effectively with other people's feelings - are at an 
advantage in any domain of life, whether romance and intimate relationships or picking up 
the unspoken rules that govern success in organizational politics."). 
129. Id. at 34. 
130. Id. at 261-300. 
131. Id. The concept called "character education" has caught on recently and is being 
taught in some schools. See Carol Innerst, College Official Champions Character-Education 
Cause, Manifesto Outlines Principles for Parents, Teachers, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A. 
Character education "is about developing virtues - good habits and dispositions which lead 
students to responsible and mature adulthood." Id. Even President Clinton challenged "all 
schools to teach 'good values and good citizenship."' Id. 
132. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 261-62. 
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In these classes, children learn to express their emotions, work well with 
others, and react appropriately when faced with contention.133 
Goleman also points out that even a narrow focus on the question 
whether genes or environmental influences are more important in measur-
ing intellectual intelligence misses a crucial point. He suggests that a focus 
on how the two measurements of intelligence can work together to en-
hance an individual's intellectual intelligence still may not reveal much 
about an individual's likelihood of success. For example, high intellectual 
intelligence may enable a person to secure a job, but Goleman asserts that 
high emotional intelligence may be necessary for a person to get promoted 
on the job.134 Someone with high intellectual intelligence may become an 
expert in English literature, for example, but the novelist herself will also 
have high emotional intelligence.135 Gardner's observation that intelli-
gence is more complex than traditional aptitude tests acknowledge is 
merely a starting point for understanding emotional intelligence and its sig-
nificance in achieving success. 
The notion of multiple intelligences, and especially the notion of emo-
tional intelligence, alters traditional perceptions of intelligence, which, in 
turn, reduces the need to rely on standard measurements of intellectual 
intelligence in policy decision-making. Understanding the importance of 
these skills and how they are developed offers insights on how we might 
reconceive the education of our children and improve human relationships, 
especially across racial boundaries. 
B. Integration and Emotional Intelligence 
As Professor Michael McConnell states, "Segregation is part and par-
cel of a system of inequality."136 High emotional intelligence skills learned 
while participating in integrated education can lead to solving the larger 
problems of racial inequality. As commonly understood, integration in the 
school desegregation context means allowing Black students to attend 
White schools.137 As McLaurin and Brown read together show, however, 
the Supreme Court meant for integration to mean more than Blacks having 
a physical presence in White schools.138 Otherwise, the McLaurin Court 
would not have held unconstitutional the intra-school segregation policy 
that required Mr. McLaurin to be separated from his White classmates in 
133. Id. at 261-76. 
134. Id. at 35. 
135. Id. 
136. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1139. I agree with this observation, but would add 
that voluntary segregation by people of color poses less of a threat to racial equality. 
137. Because this understanding does not specifically address equality concerns once 
the Black students are admitted to the school, some African-Americans have rejected the 
idea that integration is a worthwhile goal. See Johnson, supra note 16. 
138. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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the same institution.139 Further, it bears repeating that integration also 
does not mean that Blacks should assimilate into White culture. This un-
derstanding of integration is unacceptable because it reinforces White 
supremacy by making Blacks and people of other colors conform to the 
normative standard of White. Rather, integration entails achieving racial 
equality where Blacks, people of other colors, and Whites share equal 
power in all aspects of American life-including meaningful participation 
in designing and implementing governing laws and policies. In this way, 
integration and racial equality are synonymous. If we are to achieve racial 
equality, it is necessary for people of all races to begin to value each other's 
differences and learn to relate to each other with equal respect. 
A racially integrated environment is optimal for learning emotional 
intelligence skills as they apply to race relations. Even if emotional intelli-
gence is taught in a segregated environment, an individual only learns emo-
tional intelligence in limited relationships. Moreover, even if emotional 
intelligence skills in the context of race relations were taught in involunta-
rily racially segregated schools, it would be difficult to overcome the sym-
bolic messages such segregation represents. Recall that involuntarily 
segregating Black children and children of other colors from White chil-
dren stigmatizes the children of color as "inferior" to their White class-
mates. Simultaneously, involuntary segregation reinforces feelings of 
privilege in the White students. Moreover, unless students of different col-
ors are able to interact with each other, any lessons about racial equality 
and race relations remain mere abstractions to them. Each group of chil-
dren sees the other group as "other"-not someone who is a part of the 
child's real world~ Accordingly, it is easier to dismiss the importance of the 
"other" and also to dismiss the importance of getting along and respecting 
the "other." Thus, if the goal is to achieve racial equality and to use emo-
tional intelligence skills to help achieve that goal, involuntarily segregated 
schools hinder progress toward the goal. However, teaching emotional in-
. telligence skills in an integrated environment, especially in an environment 
that is truly integrated beyond merely the physical presence and assimila-
tion, takes emotional intelligence one step further. 
C. Emotional Intelligence and Race Relations 
"A report from the National Center for Clinical Infant Programs 
makes the point that school success is not predicted by a child's 
fund of facts or a precocious ability to read so much as by emo-
tional and social measures ... "140 
139. I explore this in more detail in my article, Beyond Admissions: Racial Equality in 
Law Schools, 49 U. FLA. L. REv. _ (1997) (forthcoming). 
140. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at .193. 
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Teaching our children high emotional skills in truly integrated environ-
ments can help us solve larger problems in race relations. In the context of 
race relationships then, I want to focus on three specific areas where emo-
tional intelligence can foster better race relations: learning about racism, 
managing racial anger, and developing empathy and altruism. 
1. Learning About Racism 
"Know thyself'' is an honored adage, resounding with words of wis-
dom. Yet it is a proverb that is not always easy to follow. Often individuals 
are not aware of their feelings and thus do not fully know and understand 
why they react to certain situations the way they do. "Any emotion can 
be-and often is-unconscious," Goleman asserts.141 Moreover, many de-
cisions that a person makes are emotional and extend beyond the realm of 
rationality. For example, the choice of a marriage partner generally is 
guided by more than reason.142 As we steer our ways through the decisions 
that confront us, being aware of how we felt about similar past experiences 
enables us to become more attuned to what we are feeling now. The more 
adept we are at understanding our own emotions, the more likely we are to 
manage and control the responses to them. 
The message about the importance of knowing oneself is not new. 
However, given that many of ou:r: emotions operate on us unconsciously, it 
is surprising how little consideration is given to the possibility that uncon-
scious emotions also influence policy decision makers. It may be "only 
human," for example, to believe that an individual can be objective about a 
decision regardless of his or her view on a particular matter. Had the late 
Justice Marshall been on the Bench that decided Brown, would his decision 
to join the unanimous opinion have raised questions about his objectivity? 
Conversely, can there be any doubt that his experiences as a Black man 
influenced his opinion about the unconstitutionality of the separate but 
equal doctrine?143 
Because we often are not fully aware of what motivates us to react in 
various ways to different situations, we should be particularly concerned 
about the impact our decisions might have on others. For example, Profes-
sors Paul Brest144 and, more recently, Charles Lawrence145 have explored 
and described in the literature the phenomenon of "unconscious racism." 
Professor Lawrence suggests that often a White person harbors fears or 
negative thoughts about people of color, especially Blacks, without even 
141. Id. at 54. 
142. !d. at 53. 
143. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 173-81. 
144. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. 
REv. 1, 7-8 (1976) (exploring how unfairness can result from government's "unconscious 
failure" to treat people of color as it would treat Whites). 
145. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
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being aware of it.146 A declaration by a White person that, "Some of my 
best friends are Black," is an expression of unconscious racism. The under-
lying presumption of this common sentiment is that the speaker would nor-
mally not befriend a Black person, but nevertheless has created some 
exceptions. The exceptions then allow the speaker to deny that he or she is 
racist, because, after all, how can a person be racist if he or she has friends 
of a different color? 
Just the other day, one of my daughter's teachers, a very dear elderly 
White woman, confided in me that she did not even notice that my daugh-
ter is Black. A White person who does not see another person's color fails 
to understand how her denial of the person's race is a denial of the person 
in significant and important ways.147 Imagine how a child of color feels 
when her teacher, someone she admires, does not value the child's race. 
How does the child of color develop a positive self-image and strong self-
esteem if adults devalue her race? Moreover, because the teacher openly 
devalues my daughter's racial identity, the other children in the class also 
learn to devalue racial differences. In this way, the White children's privi-
leged status gets reinforced. 
Unconscious racism perhaps can be seen as a failure to be attuned to 
our negative feelings about race. It reflects a belief that being colorless is 
better than being colorful. Consistent with the message of Professor Law-
rence and others, becoming attuned to one's own feelings is a constant 
challenge and we must learn to be sensitive to color differences among peo-
ple to minimize actively the unintended consequences of our behavior. 
The impact of unconscious racism surfaces in most post-Brown deci-
sions focusing on race and education. For example, it may be difficult for 
many people, especially White people, to believe that members of the 
Court would be intentionally racist in their opinions, except perhaps in 
Plessy. At the same time, it is also hard to believe that some members of 
the Court do not realize that their votes in particular cases promote White 
hegemony. Yet all of the post-Brown cases explored in this article are in-
fected with racism. This is obvious in cases like Rodriguez and Martinez, 
where the Court upheld state laws and policies that placed undue burdens 
on some minority children's abilities to receive a quality public education. 
It is equally obvious in Bakke, which sanctioned the concept of reverse 
146. !d. at 332. 
147. HARLAN L. DALTON, RAciAL HEALING (1995); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our 
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1991) ("Suppressing the recognition 
of a racial classification in order to act as if a person were not of some cognizable racial class 
is inherently racially premised."). On the other hand, it is not always possible to tell a 
person's race by their color. Dean Gregory Howard Williams tells a moving account of his 
experiences as a young Black boy who thought he was White for the first nine years of his 
life. GREGORY HowARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE CoLOR LINE (1995). Similarly, Profes-
sor Judy Scales-Trent describes herself as a "white Black." JuDY ScALES-TRENT, NoTES OF 
A WHITE BLAcK WoMAN: RAcE, CoLoR, CoMMUNITY (1995). These stories, as well as 
others, reinforce the notion that race is socially constructed. 
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discrimination and started the unraveling of affirmative action.148 Simi-
larly, although the plaintiffs in Kadrmas were not of color, they were poor. 
"Poverty itself delivers emotional blows to children."149 Moreover, any 
government policy that falls disproportionately on poor people also runs 
the risk of hurting people of color more than other groups due to the 
higher level of poverty for people of color.150 
Even Plyler and Fordice, which held for the plaintiffs, have similar neg-
ative racial overtones to them. Recall that Plyler, a 5-4 decision, is at risk 
of being overruled, especially given growing anti-immigrant sentiment151 
and simultaneous renewed judicial embracing of federalism under the 
Rehnquist Court.152 Most telling, perhaps, was the Plyler Court's failure 
(like in Rodriguez and Martinez) even to discuss the propriety of applying 
strict scrutiny to the legislative scheme that excluded minority children, 
thus implying that race and ethnicity were totally irrelevant to the analysis. 
The negative racial implications of Fordice also reflect powerful state-
ments about our commitment to racial and educational equality. Between 
1963 when the Mississippi Board of Trustees adopted the "ACT-only" au-
tomatic admissions requirement and 1985 when the plaintiffs' suit was initi-
ated, the disparity in scores between Whites and Blacks on the exam 
remained virtually the same. This is one reason the colleges remained seg-
regated twenty years later. Nevertheless, the Court makes it clear that 
"[w]e do not suggest that absent a discriminatory purpose different 
148. Sharon E. Rush, Understanding Affirmative Action: One Feminist's Perspective, in 
AN ETHICAL EDUCATION: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN THE MULTICULTURAL UNIVER-
SITY 195 (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 1994). 
149. "[P]oorer children at age five are already more fearful, anxious, and sad than their 
better-off peers, and have more behavior problems such as frequent tantrums and destroy-
ing things, a trend that continues through the teen years." GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 256. 
150. See generally ANDREW HAcKER, Two NATIONs: BLAcK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, 
HosTILE, UNEQUAL 99-111 (1995) (noting that "46.3 percent of black children live below 
the poverty line, compared with 12.3 percent of white youngsters"). 
151. "People should not expect to come to this country with their hands out and re-
ceive benefits paid by tax-paying Americans." Joanna Kakissis, Public Sentiment, Congres-
sional Action Growing Hostile, STAR TRIB., Dec. 7, 1995, at 20A (quoting Representative 
Bill Archer (Republican-Texas), Chairman, House Ways & Means Committee). See also 
Celia W. Dugger, Immigration Bills' Dealing May Imperil Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
12, 1996, at Bl (stating that anti-immigrant sentiment is a factor in congressional debate over 
whether to require asylum seekers to apply for asylum within one month of arriving in the 
United States or lose their right to apply for asylum); Robert Pear, U.S. Strengthening Pa-
trols Along the Mexican Border, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1996, § 1, at 8 (discussing President 
Clinton's recent signing of legislation allocating a one-half billion dollar increase to Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service budget to enhance border enforcement and detention of 
illegal aliens along Mexican border). See generally Bill Ong Ring, Beyond the Rhetoric of 
Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in 
an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 863 (1993) (critiquing both 
sides of the immigration and cultural pluralism debate). 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that congress's 
commerce power does not extend to regulation of firearms within school zones); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress lacks authority to "comman-
deer" states into regulating radio-active waste disposal). 
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programmatic ImSSlons accompanied by different admission standards 
would be constitutionally suspect simply because one or more schools are 
racially identifiable."153 Once again, the Court renews its commitment to a 
finding of "discriminatory purpose" in addition to "discriminatory effect" 
to find a constitutional violation. Adoption of this standard would be less 
disturbing if discriminatory intent could be deduced from discriminatory 
knowledge. After all, how is it possible to rely knowingly on admittedly 
biased data without intending the consequences of such reliance? But if 
the Court meant "intent" to be proved by "knowledge," it would not have 
needed to trace the continuing segregative effect of reliance on the ACT 
exam to the prior de jure segregation. It is as if more recent policies, poli-
cies adopted well beyond the shameful days of de jure segregation, will be 
virtually immune to constitutional attack because no one would believe 
that a modem state would adopt an intentionally discriminatory policy, 
and, even if a legislature adopted such a policy, no one could prove it. 
Finally, Jenkins is particularly troubling because the Court so readily 
let the federal judiciary and the state avoid addressing the continuing racial 
segregation and the continuing failure of students in the KCMSD to 
achieve at high levels. Significantly, the Court reached its conclusions by 
ignoring factual findings at the lower court levels that demonstrated the 
state's failure to meet the Freeman test of showing a "good faith effort to 
get rid of segregation to the extent practicable." Specifically, the dissent 
questioned whether, in fact, the state had even acted in good faith.154 The 
Court of Appeals found that the "'State has never offered the Court a via-
ble, even tenable, alternative [to the District Court's magnet school plan] 
and has been extremely antagonistic in its approach to effecting the deseg-
regation of the KCMSD' (emphasis in original)."155 The dissent also cited 
the Court of Appeals finding that the "'evidence on the record fell far 
short of establishing that such vestiges had been eliminated to the extent 
practicable.' "156 
The problem of racial discrimination cannot be solved by absolving 
responsible parties from their obligations to try to end it. The state has an 
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the KCMSD Black 
children's right to receive a quality public education as decided in Brown. 
The federal judiciary has an obligation to see that Missouri fulfills its duty 
"with all deliberate speed."157 Money alone could not buy Missouri out of 
its disgraceful past. On the other hand, the amount spent on Black chil-
dren's education is not inconsequential and other remedies should be tried 
in an effort to comply with Brown. At the very least, we must ask why the 
Court so willingly gave up on the goals of ending racial discrimination and 
153. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 736. 
154. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2080 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
155. ld. 
156. ld. 
157. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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providing equal educational opportunities to all children. As Justice Gins-
burg said in her dissent in Jenkins: "Given the deep, inglorious history of 
segregation in Missouri, to curtail desegregation at this time and in this 
manner is an action at once too swift and too soon. "158 
The holding in Jenkins should cause concern because we now know for 
certain we cannot satisfy the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
equal protection guarantee by providing only equal educational facilities 
for Black and White students. Gone is any sense of security that may have 
existed in knowing the fiction in Brown could be exposed, perhaps as a 
desperate plea for expending more resources on Black schools. We now 
know for certain what we suspected all along-that separate can never be 
equal in the faulty-premise sense of Brown, which built on the faulty-prem-
ise sense of procedural equality in Plessy. 
The atmosphere surrounding involuntary de facto segregation is remi-
niscent of the de jure segregation prior to Brown and makes one wonder if 
Jenkins makes the problem of involuntarily segregated public· schools 
worse with respect to Black children's right to receive a quality educa-
tion.159 Black children still suffer the consequences of attending involunta-
rily racially segregated schools, along with the societal discrimination 
against Blacks that accompanies the separate but equal doctrine, but no 
longer have hope that Brown will rescue them. 
Furthermore, since Brown, White children continue to be deprived of 
learning about Black culture and history, and, significantly, their sense of 
superiority to Blacks is reinforced as a matter of acceptable, modem social 
practice independent of the now socially unacceptable Jim Crow laws. Fi-
nally, Jenkins teaches our children that walking away from the problem of 
segregated schools is a legitimate way of dealing with it, even at the ex-
pense of their ultimate welfare. 
In short, a close examination of the post-Brown cases provides some 
evidence of the racism--conscious or unconscious-that seems to be guid-
ing education cases. Even if state policy makers and the Court could not 
see the profound racist implications of their decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, they should be able to see the aggregative effect of their decisions 
over time. We now know that our commitment to children's education and 
racial equality is waning, not just in cases like Rodriguez, Plyler, Martinez , 
Kadrmas, and Bakke, but even in the classic desegregation context itself. 
158. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J. , dissenting). 
159. Moreover, although the sting of these cases is tempered somewhat by the decision 
in U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), the finding of racial aninllls in Fordice is not likely to 
be found in future cases focusing on race discrimination, as the redistricting cases show. See 
infra note 262 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the Court did find Colorado's 
Amendment Two, which prohibited laws that protected gays and lesbians from discrimina-
tion, unconstitutional because the amendment was motivated by "aninllls." Romer v. Ev-
ans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). 
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The Jenkins Court condoned a "separate but unequal" philosophy with re-
spect to children's, especially Black children's, right to receive a free, qual-
ity public education. In other words, we now know just how shallow our 
commitment is to Brown, to children's education, and to racial equality. 
Given what we now know, it is time to revive Brown's principles of 
racial equality and educational equality. It is important to learn about ra-
cism and how to avoid unintended and unproductive consequences of deci-
sions that promote the racial divide. Consistent with high emotional 
intelligence, we can recommit to racial equality by providing all of our chil-
dren with a quality education in fully integrated schools. In tum, the chil-
dren will learn to develop their own emotional intelligence skills in the area 
of race relations. 
2. Managing Racial Anger 
Some people are mad that their tax money helps support immi-
grants.160 Others are upset that some people in our country cannot speak 
English.161 The acquittal of O.J. Simpson angered most White people.162 
The anger generated primarily among Blacks by the acquittal of the of-
ficers in the Rodney King trial fueled the fire that burned down parts of 
Los Angeles. Louis Farrakhan's rhetoric is infused with racial anger and 
hatred.163 The Aryan Nation is growing and is committed to promoting 
160. Louis Uchitelle and N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of 
Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at § 1, at 1; see also GOP Aims at Legal Immigrants, 
TAMPA TruB., Nov. 22, 1994, Nation/World, at 1 (quoting Robert Rector of the conservative 
Heritage Foundation: "There's a growing recognition that the federal welfare system can-
not serve as a deluxe retirement system for elderly people from the Third World."). 
161. For example, a Texas judge recently ordered a mother to stop speaking Spanish to 
her 5-year old daughter or face losing custody. Sam Howe Verhovek, Mother Scolded by 
Judge for Speaking in Spanish, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A12. The judge told the 
mother that speaking to her child in Spanish only was a form of child abuse which would 
relegate the child to a future as a housemaid. Patrick Rogers & Karen Roebuck, Tongue 
Lashing: A Texas Judge's English-Only Order Ignites a Bilingual War of Words, PEOPLE, 
Sept. 25, 1995, at 111. The judge later rescinded his order under pressure from political 
leaders. Ironically, the judge publicly apologized to housemaids before any apology was 
made to Mexican-Americans or other Spanish-speaking Americans. !d. 
162. Polls Reveal Racial Divide on Verdict, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), Oct. 5, 
1995, at 8A (according to a CBS News poll, taken by phone following the O.J. Simpson 
verdict, 87% of blacks said the verdict was right while 59% of whites said the verdict was 
wrong (results have a 4% margin of error)); Mark Whitaker, Decision . . . And Division, 
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 24 (reporting that "much of white America felt a surge of 
outrage" at Simpson's acquittal). Said one angry American, "White suburbia is real dis-
gusted with O.J. Simpson and disgusted with the whole black culture. It bums us up that all 
these black people are thrilled that he got off." Edwin Chen, Million Man March, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A1 (quoting Jean Easley). 
163. In 1984, Farrakhan referred to Judaism as a "gutter religion," and described Nazi 
leader Adolph Hitler as a "wickedly great" man. I'm No Hitler, Farrakhan Tells Television 
Host, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, § 1, at 23. Ten years later, Farrakahn's senior aide, Khalid 
Abdul Muhanimad, stirred national controversy over remarks made during a speech in 
which Muhanimad "called Jews the 'blood-suckers' of the black community, labeled the 
Pope as a 'no-good cracker,' and urged black South Africans to kill all whites." Farrakhan 
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White supremacy at all costs.164 These are just a few examples of how ra-
cially divided we are as a nation and how angry we are at perceived racial 
injustices. 
Probably very few, if any, people enjoy feeling out of emotional con-
trol. "Mood management," as Goleman calls it, is a full-time job.165 I fo-
cus on anger here because I believe this emotion is at the core of racial 
divisiveness and impedes efforts to achieve racial equality. Almost any ar-
ticle or book about race written by a person of color, especially an African-
American, will discuss racial anger.166 In response, other authors are ex-
pressing their anger at such things as perceived "racial preferences. "167 
Moreover, "[o]f all the moods that people want to escape, rage seems to be 
the most intransigent."168 It is "passion's slave."169 
Neurological responses account for the buildup of anger, but even 
neurological reactions are in response to some kind of environmental trig-
ger. Generally, anger is sparked by a sense of endangerment, which can be 
a physical threat or a symbolic threat to an individual's self-esteem or dig-
nityP0 Once triggered, the concomitant neurological responses make an-
ger one of the most volatile emotions. Many believe that venting anger 
dissipates it, but actually the opposite is true: anger builds on anger. Ac-
cordingly, Goleman asserts that the way to "manage" anger is to short-
circuit it before it begins. 
This is a simplistic presentation of a complex phenomenon, but it nev-
ertheless provides a foundation for discussing Black and White anger. Key 
to this discussion is recognizing that assaults to a person's self-esteem or 
dignity can be met with anger. Repeated assaults escalate the person's an-
ger, regardless of any venting the person may do. 
later demoted Muhammad and publicly rebuked his statements as "mean-spirited." Far-
rakhan did not, however, publicly rebuke the message of his aide's speech. Steven Holmes, 
Farrakhan Repudiates Speech for Tone, Not Anti-Semitism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al. 
164. "If [Aryan Nation leader] Richard Butler had his way, the northwestern corner of 
the United States would be a white-only homeland, blacks would be sent to Africa and Jews 
would be stripped of their property, expatriated, or killed." John P. Martin, Aryan Nation 's 
Butler Decries 'Enemies', MoRNING CALL (ALLENTOWN), Feb. 4, 1996, at A15. Butler 
heads a Christian Identity sect of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian which has an esti-
mated membership of 30,000 to 200,000 nationwide. Id. 
165. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 57. 
166. Representative examples include ScALES-TRENT, supra note 147; WILLIAMS, 
supra note 147; JoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLAcK 
MIDDLE-CLASS ExPERIENCE (1994) (reporting on and analyzing the results of interviews 
and discussions of racism with more than 200 Black professionals); Jerome McCristal Culp, 
Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 665, 679 (1995); and Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 
673, 728 (1992). 
167. DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCI-
ETY (1995). 
168. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 59. 
169. Id. at 56. 
170. Id. at 60. 
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The buildup of anger in African-Americans is a phenomenon that has 
been memorialized by novelists171 and studied as a mental condition by 
psychiatrists.172 More recently, bell hooks has written a book about it, sug-
gesting that Black rage can be a source of positive energy in the struggle 
against racism.173 Black anger started with the historical enslavement of 
African-Americans and it festers because African-Americans continue to 
suffer racial oppression. "[B]lack rage results from a simmering resent-
ment built up over a long period of time."174 
The anger generated by the racial divisiveness is also apparent among 
Whites, although the source of White anger is significantly different from · 
the source of Black anger. Specifically, Whites enjoy a privileged status in 
our society because of their color. Professor Cheryl Harris brilliantly de-
scribes how Whiteness is equivalent to a property interest.175 Just as the 
Black child learns that he or she is "inferior" to Whites, the White child 
learns that he or she is "superior" to Blacks. These related messages are 
conveyed and taught to children consciously and unconsciously. Corre-
spondingly, Whites like Allan Bakke eventually learn to expect they should 
not be denied the right to enjoy their "superior" status because of their 
race. The colorblindness philosophy implicit in cases like Bakke operates 
to preserve the privileged status of Whiteness and affirms a racial hierarchy 
in which white is valued over black. When Whites perceive that they have 
been unjustly excluded from programs or from jobs because "preference" 
is given to someone who is not White, their dignity also has been assaulted 
and the result is anger. 
Black anger, then, results from being historically and systematically 
denied privilege, while White anger results from the perceived threat of 
losing historical and system-wide privilege. The distinction is critical, but it 
is also critical to pay attention to the fact that almost everyone is angry 
about race. Consequently, it is important to think about how to manage 
racial anger. 
Venting anger in thoughtless ways in response to highly emotional 
events, such as the Rodney King trial verdict or the O.J. Simpson trial ver-
dict, fails to deal with the underlying causes for the anger. Similarly, pro-
viding temporary remedies to racial problems-supporting affirmative 
action policies and then backing away from them depending on the polit-
ical climate-will not repair the damage or break the cycle of anger gener-
ated by poor race relations. It may actually exacerbate the problem. 
Goleman suggests that angry feelings themselves must be managed before 
171. See, e.g. , ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PuRPLE (1982); RicHARD WRIGHT, NA-
TivE SON (1940). 
172. See Judd F. Sneirson, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to 
a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2251, 2255-58 (1995). 
173. bell hooks, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995). 
174. Sneirson, supra note 172, at 2282 (footnote omitted). 
175. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993). 
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they have a chance to "hijack" us.176 Once the emotional hijacking occurs, 
we become more susceptible to the initial triggers as we sense the threats 
and familiar anger that go along with them. 
On the subject of affirmative integration policies, it seems that many 
people's emotions have been hijacked. In my opinion, the hijacking began 
with the decision in Bakke, which sparked a fight between Whites and 
Blacks and people of other colors. In striking down the U.C. Davis Medi-
cal School admissions policy that actively sought to integrate the school, 
the Court held it would be unfair to hold Allan Bakke, an innocent victim, 
responsible for solving the School's problem of racial segregation. The 
Court was ·concerned with augmenting the racial divide between Blacks 
and Whites by upholding a policy that made White people angry.177 
Noticeably absent from the Court's decision is any recognition of how 
angry people of color are at being systematically excluded from participat-
ing in state programs. From the Court's perspective, it is as if anger were a 
relevant factor only if the policy were upheld. The simmering anger that 
Blacks and people of other colors feel at constantly being discriminated 
against on the basis of their race was seemingly entirely invisible or irrele-
vant to the Court. The risk of making White people angrier at the en-
croachment of people of color in the practice of medicine was too great for 
the Court. Its decision, therefore, placed the burden of controlling racial 
anger on people of color. 
Significantly, the Court's decision also suggests that even people of 
color should reject affirmative integration policies because of the stigma 
that is associated with them. For example, prominent Black scholars like 
Professor Stephen Carter of the Yale Law School adhere to the position 
that affirmative integration policies are degrading to Blacks because of the 
stigma attached to them.178 Justice Thomas votes to strike down affirma-
tive integration policies. Many of his opinions reflect an angry tone at the 
suggestion that Blacks are incapable of succeeding without such policies. 
His most recent opinion in Adarand exemplifies this: 
So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of 
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot 
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevita-
bly, such programs engender attitudes of superiority, or, alterna-
tively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they 
have been wronged by the government's use of race ... 
176. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
177. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
178. STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AcriON BABY 47-69 
(1991). 
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In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination 
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination in-
spired by malicious prejudice.179 
35 
State sponsored stigmatization of someone as racially "inferior" is a 
serious matter in a society that is committed to democracy and equal pro-
tection-so serious, in fact, that the Brown Court overruled Plessy primar-
ily because of the stigmatic harm the separate but equal doctrine did to 
Blacks in requiring public school segregation.180 Yet there is something 
troubling about this point when it is applied in the integration context 
where the State attempts to help Blacks obtain jobs or get admitted into 
educational programs. How is it possible to equate discrimination in the 
integration context with discrimination in an involuntary segregation con-
text? To view them as equally "noxious" is troubling because it suggests 
that all forms of discrimination are unpalatable and at odds with the funda-
mental nature of law. In reality, however, all laws discriminate and draw 
distinctions between and among people. The real question is whether the 
government can justify the distinctions its laws make.181 Given the 
profound history of racial discrimination against Blacks, to discriminate in 
their favor seems justifiable. 
Basing decisions on the constitutionality of policies that actively func-
tion to integrate government institutions by focusing on the "inferiority" 
point is troubling for another reason as well.182 Rejecting affirmative inte-
gration policies because they stigmatize people of color may seem to be 
"racially neutral" or even supportive of people of color. Unfortunately, 
people of color are stigmatized even without affirmative integration poli-
cies. Specifically, the absence of Blacks and people of other colors from 
state jobs and programs is also stigmatizing because it implies that people 
of color are not qualified to be in those jobs or programs.183 A focus on 
179. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
180. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
181. A lesson from Erwin Chemerinsky. 
182. I am particularly grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky for sharing his thoughts with me 
on this issue and helping me understand how to deal with the affirmative action debate in 
the context of my own life. As a white woman who has been identified publicly as an "af-
firmative action hire" at my institution (along with the few other women at the time), I have 
had to deal personally with the meaning of this reality. Undoubtedly, the "public accusa-
tion" was intended as a "put-down;" as a message that I (and my women colleagues) were 
hired only because we are women and that we were not the most qualified applicants for the 
job (who, by implication, were men). Given the dearth of women on the faculty when I was 
hired, it is unlikely that I (and my female colleagues) would have been hired without an 
affirmative decision on the part of the faculty to hire women. As Prof. Chemerinsky 
pointed out to me, however, it is also true that if the faculty had not made that affirmative 
decision to hire women, all women would have been stigmatized because of the resounding 
message that no women are qualified to be on a law school faculty. In this way, the stigma 
argument is a no-win situation for minorities. 
183. A lesson from Erwin Chemerinsky. 
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only part of the stigma problem that denounces affirmative integration pol-
icies, which are partially based on the recognition that admissions criteria 
like standardized exams are racially biased, still excludes Blacks and people 
of other colors. 
Thus, the affirmative action debate rages on as if it has nothing to do 
with promoting the values of integration and racial equality. Moreover, the 
anger it causes is fueled by national leaders like California's Governor Pete 
Wilson who appeal to White voters by promising not to favor people of 
color over them, or stated alternatively, by adhering to current policies that 
favor them over people of color.184 Petition drives are going on in some 
parts of the country to outlaw affirmative integration programs because 
many Whites, some Blacks, and some people of other colors are angry at 
the perceived unfairness in them.185 Affirmative action has become a focal 
point for some Whites to speak out against racial equality, even though 
they may not understand this is the unintended consequence of their anti-
affirmative action stance. Sadly, affirmative action has turned into our na-
tion's racial scapegoat; it is being used explicitly to divide people along race 
lines. 
We can stop this. First, consistent with high emotional intelligence, we 
can listen to each other and acknowledge our own and other people's an-
ger. Only then can "cognitive reframing" begin, which is necessary to es-
cape the emotional hijacking we are facing on the issue of racial equality 
and, in particular, affirmative action.186 Under this view, the burden thus 
falls on individuals to become attuned to their own angry feelings about 
race and develop skills for expressing concerns in ways that are not accusa-
tory or self-righteous.187 Second, we can strive to understand the impor-
tant role affirmative action plays in promoting racial equality. As 
explained above, unless we value integration and learn to respect people of 
different races, racial equality will remain elusive. Finally, we can begin to 
heal the racial division by focusing on developing our empathic and altruis-
tic skills. 
184. Trevor W. Coleman, A Backlash Cancels Gains in Civil Rights, HARTFORD Cou-
RANT, July 4, 1995, at A9. 
185. See B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Fighting Affirmative Action, He Finds His Race an 
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at A1 (reporting that forces fighting affirmative action 
collected 693,230 petition signatures in California to put the issue to a statewide vote on the 
fall ballot). 
As this article was in its final editing stages, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
Proposition 209, an amendment to California's Constitution that prohibits the use of race-
based and gender-based affirmative action programs in public employment, public educa-
tion, or public contracting. The Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6512 (9th Cir. April 8, 1997). 
186. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 74. 
187. !d. 
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3. Developing Empathy and Altruism 
"Empathy" is "the ability to know how another feels."188 "Altruism" 
is the ability to act on one's empathic feelings toward another.189 The feel-
ings are related in that the stronger an individual's empathetic response to 
another person's suffering, the more likely that the individual will help the 
victim. 
Many scholars, especially feminist scholars, have explored already the 
role of empathy in legal decision-making.190 Empathy is particularly rele-
vant to race relations, for we need to foster greater interracial understand-
ing. The different races, and particularly White people, need to understand 
on a much deeper level what it must be like to be a different color. Such 
understanding is difficult in the midst of current rhetoric that color is irrele-
vant. This rhetoric perpetuates a color caste system in which white is the 
most valued color. Accordingly, we (especially Whites) must strive both to 
understand that color matters and to do something about the disparity in 
the way people of color are devalued compared to the way White people 
are valued. This moves us beyond empathy and into action. 
In many ways, our legal system does not expect people to be altruistic. 
The "no duty to rescue" rule protects people who do not want to help vic-
tims. On the other hand, as . Goleman notes, even John Stuart Mill wrote 
that our natural feelings of empathy and our ability to protect ourselves 
from the hurt that comes from the wounding of others is the "guardian of 
justice."191 Seeing the connections among empathy, altruism, and justice is 
indicative of high emotional intelligence. But is this too much to ask in a 
society where individual sacrifice becomes necessary to achieve racial and 
educational equality? 
188. Id. at 96. 
189. Id. at 105. 
190. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); 
Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism: Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Com-
munitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 930 (1995). 
191. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 105; see also John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, re-
printed in THE PmLOSOPHY OF JoHN STUART MILL 328 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961). On 
what is "just," Mill wrote that 
[i]t is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether 
good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust, that he should obtain a good, or be 
made to undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest 
and most empathetic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general 
mind. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JoHN STUART MILL, supra, at 374. On empathy, Mill observed, 
a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between him-
self and the human society of which he forms a part such that any conduct which 
threatens the security of the society generally is threatening to his own, and calls 
forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of self-defiance. 
Id. at 382. 
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Several years ago, my home institution conducted a national search for 
a university president.192 The university is located in a sleepy southern 
town and, not surprisingly, had few women and people of color on the 
faculty or in top administrative positions. As a state university, it was com-
mitted to equality and had an affirmative action policy in an attempt to 
increase the representation of women and people of color as professors and 
administrators. The presidential search came down to two candidates-a 
White man and a Black woman. All the news media surrounding the presi-
dent's selection presented both finalists as "equally qualified." For a few 
days there was suspense in the community speculated about which candi-
date would get the job. Some wondered if the Board of Regents would 
really be able to hire a Black woman as president. As it turned out, of 
course, they did not break with tradition and the White man was hired. 
I have often wondered what would have happened if the White man 
who was in final contention for the job decided he did not want the presi-
dency-after the record of the Black woman being "equally qualified" was 
made public. Suppose he had decided it was important for the university to 
hire the Black woman, who presumably would be hired if he were no 
longer interested in the position. Dropping out of contention could have 
been consistent with his commitment to racial equality. Even if the univer-
sity re-opened the search after he dropped out, he nevertheless could have 
left the community-the entire educational community-with a profound 
message about the value of racial equality and educational equality. 
Admittedly, for the presidential candidate to forsake a job that he may 
have wanted is asking a lot, perhaps too much. Maybe it was too much to 
expect Allan Bakke to accept his rejection from over ten medical schools 
two years in a row without suing for one of those 16 spots at the U.C. Davis 
Medical School that were targeted for people of color. Perhaps i~ was ask-
ing too much of the McAllen, Texas, community to let eight-year-old Ro-
berto live with his sister and go to the public schools there. It also may be 
too much to ask communities to adopt taxing schemes that will help subsi-
dize bus rides so that poor kids can get to the schools. Maybe it was asking 
too much for families to stay in the Kansas City, Missouri, school district 
and fight for racial equality and educational equality rather than fleeing to 
the suburbs. 
Each of these situations poses difficult dilemmas for the individuals 
who are affected by them. Certainly, I do not mean to suggest how any one 
individual, family, or community should respond in any particular situation. 
It is relatively easy to discuss these things in the abstract, but it is quite 
another matter when they affect us personally. These examples do raise, 
however, the fundamental question of whether we are truly committed to 
racial equality. If we could answer that question, then we would be clearer 
192. I talk about this story in my article, Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Understanding Diver-
sity, 42 U . FLA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 & n.25 (1990). 
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about how we want to structure our laws and make decisions to achieve 
that goal. 
There was a time when we seemed more committed as a nation to 
racial and educational equality than we seem to be at present. The passage 
of the Civil Rights Act193 and the holding in Brown illustrated our earlier 
commitment. Admittedly, even then there was a lot of hostility directed at 
government efforts to achieve racial equality. Nevertheless, the federal 
government, many state and local governments, and many citizens held fast 
to the underlying principles behind laws like the Civil Rights Act and 
Brown. In contrast, current trends, especially at the nationallevel,194 are to 
give in to racial inequality-to walk away from the KCMSD, to forget 
about Roberto, Sarita and her siblings. Some states are even enacting laws 
like Proposition 187 that are dramatically at odds with equality and demo-
cratic principles.195 
If sacrifices on behalf of racial equality are always too much to ask, 
then we should be prepared for a return to involuntary de facto segrega-
tion. Alternatively, if we do not want an involuntarily segregated society, 
we need to chart a new course. Employing high emotional intelligence 
skills offers insights into how we might do this. Leaders with high intellec-
tual and emotional skills are necessary if we want to renew our commit-
ment to racial and educational equality. 
III. 
A PLEA TO ADULTS FOR EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT 
LEADERSHIP IN PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALIT Y A ND 
RESPECfFUL INTERRACIAL RELATIONS 
A. Coaching Our Children to Develop Emotional Intelligence 
To secure healthy friendships, children need to develop appropriate 
social skills-skills that will also help them in their adult relationships. 
Goleman explains that one essential skill we need to have healthy interper-
sonal relationships is to be able to make others feel good about themselves 
without losing our integrity.196 While this might seem obvious and even 
simple, it is a learned behavior. For example, the child who wants to join a 
group of toddlers already at play needs to know how to use her social skills 
to get the group to welcome her. Studies show that the child who tries to 
draw attention to herself and away from the group is likely to be rejected 
by the group. The child who is able to patiently observe the playgroup and 
193. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1964). 
194. Some states expressly provide a constitutional right to a free public education for 
every child. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra. notes 59 and 60 and accompanying text. 
196. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 119. 
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assess how and when it is best to try to join in is a welcome addition.197 
Moreover, the socially attuned child usually engages in some kind of be-
havior that tells the other children she understands and accepts the group 
and waits to have her acceptance confirmed before she actively participates 
by voicing opinions. A child learns how to manage her interpersonal skills, 
as described above, through modeling.198 "[W]e unconsciously imitate the 
emotions we see displayed by someone else, through an out-of-awareness 
motor mimicry of their facial expression, gestures, tone of voice, and other 
nonverbal markers of emotion."199 This tendency places tremendous re-
sponsibility on adults to develop our own emotional intelligence so that we 
can act as "emotional coaches" for our children.200 
Teaching children to respect children of different races may be one of 
the most important coaching jobs we do as adults. Modeling respect for 
racial differences is important if we are to achieve racial equality. Signifi-
cantly, the importance of non-verbal cues in creating racial strife is worth 
examining. If how something is said is at least as important as what is said, 
then adults need to pay closer attention to the silent racial messages they 
give to children. For example, many important policy decision makers, as 
well as some Supreme Court Justices, believe that society is colorblind.201 
Consistent with this verbal message, many government policies are re-
quired to reflect that race is a facially neutral factor in decisionmaking. 
Challenging this verbal message, however, is an overwhelming non-
verbal message that race is far from irrelevant in our society and that, in 
fact, it matters a lot. Consider placement of children in educational pro-
grams designed to meet their specific needs. Black children are two times 
more likely than White children to be targeted for "special education" pro-
grams, but are rarely selected for "gifted" programs, which are predomi-
nantly comprised of White children.Z02 Although Brown and McLaurin 
challenged the legitimacy of the separate but equal doctrine by attempting 
to expose the real message that involuntary segregation stamps a badge of 
inferiority on African-American children, we nevertheless continue to 
stamp them with that badge by the way educational placements are made. · 
Moreover, the examples of the ways in which people of color are devalued 
in our society and the concomitant ways in which White people are valued 
are staggering. Today's verbal message that the races are "equal" and that 
197. See id. a:t 123-24 (citing Thomas Hatch, Social Intelligence in Children, Paper De-
livered at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association (1990)). 
198. Id. at 113. 
199. Id. at 115. 
200. Id. at 191. 
201. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
202. Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 
Wis. L. REv. 1237, 1251, 1256. Consider this in light of Hermstein's and Murray's sugges-
tion that some remedial education programs be discontinued in favor of increased programs 
for gifted students. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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we are a colorblind society defies the message we give to children by the 
disparate ways we treat people of color and Whites. 
Many of our children, particularly our children of color, are in trouble. 
Many prominent children's advocates have written moving accounts of the 
bleak lives of some of our children-Andrew Hacker,2°3 Jonathan Kozol,2°4 
Robert Coles,205 Alex Kotlowitz,206 Marian Wright Edelman207, to list a 
few. All children are increasingly becoming victims of poverty,2°8 vio-
lence,209 abuse,210 delinquency,211 drugs,212 sexual promiscuity,213 teenage 
pregnancy,214 depression,215 suicide,216 unemployment,217 and illiteracy.218 
Moreover, Goleman points out that "if the focus is on African-American 
youth, especially in the inner city, (the situation] is utterly bleak-all the 
203. See supra note 150. 
204. See supra note 1. 
205. Robert Coles has written a library of books on children, including a five volume 
series entitled CHILDREN OF CRISIS. The CHILDREN OF CRISIS series includes the following 
titles: CHILDREN oF Crusrs: A STUDY oF CoURAGE AND FEAR (1967); MIGRANTs, SHARE· 
CROPPERS, MOUNTAINEERS (1971); THE SoUTH GOES NORTH (1971); ESKIMOS, CHICANOS, 
INDIANS (1977); and PRIVILEGED ONES: THE WELL-OFF AND THE RICH IN AMERICA 
(1977). 
206. THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991). 
207. GUIDE MY FEET (1995); THE MEASURE OF OUR SUCCESS (1993). 
208. See Barbara Crossette, Toll of Childbearing, 585,000 Women Die Per Year, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at A12 (reporting that of 18leading industrialized nations, "only [two 
countries] have poorer children on average than the U.S." and that "half the children living 
with a single mother in the U.S ... are living in poverty"). 
209. See Janet Allon, Gang Trials Start, But Drugs Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at 
13-16 (reporting the story of two teenagers' deaths due to gang violence). 
210. See Tamar Lewin, Parents Poll Finds Child Abuse to Be More Common, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, at A17 ("One [study] estimated, based on parents' own reports, that 
more than three million children are physically abused each year in the name of 
discipline."). 
211. See Wendy A Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult 
Power in Juvenile Justice, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 495. 
212. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; End the War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at 
A29 (discussing effects of drugs on children). 
213. See Andrea Adelson, A Campaign in California Aims to Reduce Sex and 
Pregnancies Among Teen-agers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at D5 (quoting Gov. Pete Wilson, 
concerned about the cost of a "vicious cycle of promiscuity and irresponsibility"). 
214. See Mireya Navarro, Teen-age Mothers Viewed as Abused Prey of Older Men, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 1, at 1 (discussing the trend of trying to reduce teen pregnancy by 
toughening statutory rape laws). A recent study found the total cost of teen pregnancy to be 
nearly $7 billion. "[A]ll told, about 500,000 children a year are born to girls 15 to 19 ... . " 
Steven A. Holmes, '96 Cost of Teen Pregnancy Is Put at $7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
1996, at All. 
215. See KozoL, supra note 1 (describing bleak lives of some children, with touching 
insights of their frustrations, despair, and hopes). 
216. See Ira Berkow, An Athlete Is Dead at 17 and No One Can Say Why, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 1995, § 8, at 1 ("Suicide has become one of the major causes of death among Ameri-
can teen-agers. In 1992 . .. 1,847 teens killed themselves, which is 10.8 for every 100,000. ") 
217. See Fox Butterfield, Crime Continues to Decline, but Experts Warn of Coming 
'Storm' of Juvenile Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 1, at 18 (discussing the interaction 
between juvenile violence and high unemployment rates). 
218. See GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 232. 
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rates are higher by far, sometimes doubled, sometimes tripled or 
higher. "219 
If we are going to stop the downward spiral of many of our children, 
we need to teach them, among other things, high emotional intelligence 
skills. Unfortunately, simply providing a child with an emotional coach 
does not ensure that she will develop a healthy sense of herself. Someone 
who is adept at engaging others can do so in either a positive or negative 
way.220 As Goleman explains, "Setting the emotional tone of an interac-
tion is, in a sense, a sign of dominance at a deep and intimate level: it 
means driving the emotional state of the other person."221 Thus, a child 
whose emotional intelligence is under-developed is at risk of wanting atten-
tion, approval, and affection so badly that she may accept it from people 
who will not promote her best interest and may even cause her harm. Vio-
lent gangs, for example, may offer a place of social acceptance for the emo-
tionally vulnerable child. Consequently, for a child to develop adequate 
interpersonal skills and master the art of human relations, she will need to 
be surrounded by adults with high intellectual and emotional skills. 
B. Filling the Leadership Void 
1. Teaching our Children not to be Racist 
Our children are watching us. They learn about race and race rela-
tions from us. As adults, we must be careful not to promote a vision of 
social reality that teaches non-White children that they are racially inferior 
or that teaches White children that they are racially superior. Accordingly, 
as adults, as parents, as educators, we are under a special duty to teach our 
children not to be racist. For example, consider Hulond Humphries, Princi-
pal of Randolph County High School in Widowee, Alabama, who prohib-
ited interracial couples from attending the school prom.222 Why did state 
officials fail to send the resounding message that intentional racism is intol-
erable, perhaps by publicly denouncing Principal Humphries for his re-
marks, or asking for his resignation, or even firing him if an investigation 
219. Id. at 232. 
220. Id. at 117. 
221. Id. This is exactly what Joan Williams offered several years ago as an observation 
of the power relationships women have with their children. Joan C. Williams, Deconstruct-
ing Gender, 87 MicH. L. REv. 797, 843 (1989). Still, something about this observation should 
give us pause. 
222. Principal Humphries announced during a school assembly in February that he 
would cancel the prom if interracial couples planned to attend. During the same assembly, 
he reportedly called a mixed-race student a "mistake." Sue Ann Pressley, Alabama Ham-
let's Wounds From Racial Controversy Slow to Heal, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1996, at A3. Par-
ents and civil lights leaders, who planned to take the school board to court to demand 
Humphries' dismissal, reached a settlement agreement with the board which forbids Hum-
phries to visit any school in the district during school hours. Ronald Smothers, Once Princi-
pal, but Now Barred From All Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at B7. 
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warranted it?223 If the principal's policy and remark were unintentional, a 
consequence of.his unconscious racism, why was he not remorseful· when it 
became apparent to him that he had augmented the racial divide in his 
community and the nation? Not only did Mr. Humphries show no signs of 
contrition, but he declared his intention to run for Randolph County 
School Superintendent in November.224 
Parents, educators, teachers, and people who care about the quality of 
our children's lives all want our children to be with responsible adults who 
possess high emotional intelligence skills. Consistent with this shared aspi-
ration, we may want to focus on a few specific goals. First, we should give 
serious consideration to adopting programs that teach our children about 
emotional intelligence. For example, East Rock School in New Haven, 
Connecticut, has been experimenting since 1990 with teaching children 
emotional intelligence as a way of trying to reduce the chances a child will 
end up in "trouble. "225 Early results in the experiment do show a reduction 
in sexual promiscuity, fighting, and drop-out rates among students at the 
school, but the researchers say it is too soon to tell just how effective the 
program is. There is little doubt, however, that not only is school success 
largely measured by a child's ability to handle her emotions,Z26 but a child's 
self-esteem is inextricably related to achievement in school, as well.Z27 
Toward this end, we need to teach our children "self-efficacy," that is, 
how to motivate themselves. We can help children learn this by paying 
close attention to a child's interests and talents. Rather than being anxious, 
angry, or depressed, the child who is able to find his "flow" zone is likely to 
be happy and successful. For example, a child who receives encouragement 
and praise for developing talents and skills that bring him pleasure (read-
ing, piano playing, running, or whatever), is likely to have an intact self-
esteem. He is likely to have a sense of control over his life and will moti-
vate himself to achieve excellence in those areas he loves as well as other 
areas he needs to master.228 Moreover, the self-motivated child is better 
223. Humphries was not fired by the school board; he was pushed into a new position 
as a special consultant to the school board. Pressley, supra note 228. Ironically, Humphries' 
new duties include supervising the construction of a building to replace the old Randolph 
County High School building, which burned to the ground in an apparent arson during the 
controversy over Humphries' remarks. Campaign by Ousted Principal Draws Fire, MoNT-
GOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 6, 1996, at 5B. 
224. Humphries remained unapologetic throughout the controversy, stating that "he 
had no intention of resigning to satisfy troublesome outsiders." Pressley, supra note 222. 
225. Daniel Goleman, Teaching Emotional Self Control; Defusing Violence Is Part of 
Curriculum in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at B8. 
226. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 192. "The classroom, of course, is as much a social 
situation as an academic one; the socially awkward child is as likely to misread and rnis-
respond to a teacher as to another child. The resulting anxiety and bewilderment can them-
selves interfere with their ability to learn effectively." !d. at 122. 
227. !d. at 274 (quoting Dr. David Hamburg, a psychiatrist: "A child's sense of self-
worth depends substantially on his or her ability to achieve in school"). 
228. !d. at 244. 
44 REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. XXIII:l 
prepared to overcome hardships and setbacks than is the child who is moti-
vated to perform in order to escape punishment or secure rewards.229 
Second, we should integrate our schools and communities. Today, 
63.2% of our public schools are racially segregated.230 One-third of all 
Black students attend schools that are 90% to 100% minorities (Black, His-
panic, Asian, or Native American).231 Within integrated public schools, 
segregation is nevertheless pervasive. "[W]hile black pupils represent 16 
percent of all public school students, they make up almost 40 percent of 
those who are classed as mentally retarded, disabled, or otherwise defi-
cient."232 Most public school curricula are Eurocentric and provide little, if 
any, courses of study that focus on African-American history, culture, or 
tradition.233 Of 27,713 doctoral degrees awarded in 1992, only 1,081 (3.9%) 
were earned by Black men and women.234 
Brown had it right: We must integrate our schools because integration 
is not just consistent with racial and educational equality principles, it is 
essential to them. Some research indicates that for Black students to 
achieve at their optimal level, they need to attend schools where Blacks 
comprise at least 20% of the population.235 Other studies indicate that 
achievement test scores of Blacks and Whites are closer and show less dis-
parity when the students attend school together.236 Moreover, integrated 
schools where children of all colors work and play together will help pro-
mote race relations and may be our best hope for the future of race rela-
tions. As Goleman's work indicates: 
What can make a difference [to breaking down stereotypes], 
though, is a sustained camaraderie and daily efforts toward a com-
mon goal by people of different backgrounds. The lesson here is 
from school desegregation: when groups fail to mix socially, in-
stead forming hostile cliques, the negative stereotypes intensify. 
But when students have worked together as equals to attain a 
common goal, as on sports teams or in bands, their stereotypes 
break down-as can happen naturally in the workplace, when 
people work together as peers over the years.Z37 
Accordingly, even if the Jenkins Court believed that the federal judici-
ary had overstepped its authority by ordering some of the measures that it 
did, even if the state did act in good faith, and even if Missouri could not 
229. !d. at 94. 
230. HACKER, supra note 150, at 167. 
231. Kunen, supra, note 108, at 38. 
232. HAcKER, supra note 150, at 168; see also Glennon, supra note 202. 
233. HACKER, supra note 150, at 172. 
234. !d. at 129. 
235. !d. at 171. 
236. powell, supra note 40, at 789. 
237. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 159 (citing PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RA-
CISM (John F. Davidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds. 1987)). 
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afford to put more money into the magnet school program, the Court and 
the state of Missouri still faced the hardest question posed by Brown: How 
do we move beyond the effects of Plessy? Every case that focuses on race, 
poverty, and education faces this question. Justice Harlan's hope, our only 
hope for "political unity," a value so fundamental to constitutional law and 
democratic theory, lies in integrating our public schools and 
communities.Z38 
For school integration to foster racial camaraderie effectively, the les-
son from McLaurin that integration in the classroom is constitutionally re-
quired must be taken seriously and curricula must be structured to promote 
this goal. Less reliance should be placed on biased testing procedures in 
student placements. This should reduce the disproportionately higher per-
centage of Black children being placed in special education programs. 
More effort should be made to integrate "gifted" programs, perhaps look-
ing at a child's multiple-intelligences instead of relying exclusively on math 
and verbal mental acuity, as measured by standardized exams. Finally, cur-
ricula should focus on including African-American and other cultural 
themes not traditionally taught. Learning about different races and cul-
tures affirms all students and teaches all students to respect each other. 
2. Individual and Institutional Responsibility to Promote Racial Equality 
The reader may recall the recent incident at Denny's Restaurant when 
a number of Black Secret Service agents were made to wait over an hour 
for their breakfast while White customers were served immediately.Z39 
Goleman tells a related story in his book about a shift manager, Sylvia 
Skeeter, at another Denny's Restaurant.240 Ms. Skeeter witnessed wait-
resses ignoring a group of Black customers. She described the waitresses 
treatment of the customers: "They 'would kind of glare, with their hands on 
their hips, and then they'd go back to talking among themselves, like a 
black person standing five feet away didn't exist.' "241 The waitresses did 
not respond favorably to her when she asked them about it. When she 
complained to her supervisor, the supervisor "shrugged off their actions, 
saying, 'That's how they were raised, and there's nothing I can do about 
it.' "242 Frustrated, but indignant at the blatant racism, Ms. Skeeter quit in 
protest over the inequality in treatment of Black customers.243 She also 
testified against Denny's in a lawsuit that resulted in a $54 million settle-
ment on behalf of thousands of Black customers.244 
238. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
239. GOLEMAN, supra note 20, at 155. 
240. Id. 
241. ld. 
242. ld. 
243. ld. 
244. ld. 
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· Ms. Skeeter showed remarkable leadership. It is a reminder that what 
we do is often more telling than what we say. Ironically and sadly, it took 
someone at the lower end of the employment hierarchy to take a stand 
against the racist policy of the restaurant. Significantly, Ms. Skeeter is a 
Black woman and, like most Black women, probably struggles to overcome 
both race and sex discrimination in employment.245 When she quit her po-
sition at Denny's, she placed herself at some, perhaps considerable, career 
and financial risk. 
Contrast the waitress's response to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Jenkins. Emphasizing the Court's understandable eagerness to turn mat-
ters of education back to the State, Justice O'Connor would absolve Mis-
souri and the federal judiciary of their constitutional obligations to end 
racial segregation and provide a quality education to KCMSD Black stu-
dents because the continuing racial segregation in KCMSD is due to "myr-
iad factors of human existence. "246 This sounds remarkably like the Plessy 
Court when it said that, "If the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of 
each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals ... [Legislation] 
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts ... "247 
These excerpts from Jenkins and Plessy give the impression that the 
Court is powerless to do anything about the oppression of Blacks by White 
society and purport to take a neutral stance on the issue of race relations. 
This way of thinking makes the Brown decision peculiar outside of its hold-
ing, given the Court's willingness to ignore the actual disparities in per pu-
pil expenditures. In reality, however, the Plessy Court's opinion as well as 
more recent race cases in which the Court appears unwilling to acknowl-
edge its influential political and social role are anything but neutral. What 
the Court does not acknowledge in either Jenkins or Plessy is the role its 
legal analysis plays in shaping social relationships. A decision not to en-
force a desegregation order mandated by the Brown Court's interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is a decision condoning segregation. Con-
sider this quote from Professor McConnell, "It was the Jim Crow legisla-
tors in the Southern states (not Plessy) who sought to use legislation to 
affect racial instincts-to shore up and intensify racial prejudice that was 
245. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139. 
246. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (O'Connor, J. , concurring)). As Professor john a. powell recently 
noted, this position of the Court also absolved it of any serious discussion of the reasons for 
the continuing segregation in Kansas City schools. "The majority opinion never discussed 
the history of housing discrimination, lending bias, public housing construction, federal 
home mortgage loan programs, or other contributors to racial segregation." powell, supra 
note 40, at 751. 
247. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
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not strong enough to produce thoroughgoing apartheid without the assist-
ance of law."248 
Judicial protection of racism is an inadequate and irresponsible re-
sponse to equal protection claims of racial discrimination. Like Ms. 
Skeeter, we each have a responsibility to speak out against racism and use 
appropriate displays of power to eradicate it. This responsibility falls espe-
cially heavily on public officers and leaders. As Goleman states, 
"[E]verything we know about the roots of prejudice and how to fight it 
effectively suggests that precisely this attitude-turning a blind eye to acts 
of bias-allows discrimination to thrive."249 
Moreover, even if the Court felt stymied by rules of judicial restraint 
in Plessy and Jenkins, it nevertheless could have used its institutional posi-
tion to strongly and unequivocally condemn racism and hold states to their 
constitutional duty to comply with Brown. Nothing in the Constitution 
prevents Justices from taking positions on issues; Justices often call upon 
the legislative and executive branches to take action consistent with their 
authorities to right wrongs seen by the Justices from the Bench. For exam-
ple, former Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Plyler spoke out quite strongly 
against the Texas statute that denied undocumented alien children a free 
public education. Invoking principles of judicial restraint and federalism, 
he said: "Were it [the Court's] business to set the Nation's social policy, I 
would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened soci-
ety to deprive any children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary ed-
ucation."250 It is hard to disagree with the proposition that education of 
our children is important. Significantly, on this issue, the Plyler Justices 
were all in agreement and not afraid to say so. 
Closely related, state and federal legislatures could pass laws aimed at 
dismantling racism, especially in education-fairer housing laws,251 and 
fairer taxing schemes to finance schools, for example. Indeed, States can 
continue to promote racial and educational equality under their own con-
stitutions.Z52 For example, in 1989-21 years after Rodriguez-the Texa& 
Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution as requiring "equal edu-
cational advantages for all"253 and ordered the state to adopt a funding 
plan that would provide greater parity in per pupil expenditures between 
248. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1128. 
249. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 158. 
250. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
251. powell, supra note 40, at 780. 
252. For a discussion of the viability of state constitutions, particularly with regard to 
addressing poverty and children's welfare, see Daan Bravemen, Symposium: After the War: 
Poverty Law in the 1980's: Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577 
(1989). 
253. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
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the poorer and wealthier school districts.254. Other states explicitly provide 
in their constitutions for a free quality public education for every child.255 
State and federal judges also could interpret laws in ways that promote 
racial and educational equality. For example, the federal Constitution does 
not require proof of discriminatory intent in equal protection challenges 
based on racial discrimination.256 When the Supreme Court in Washington 
v. Davis read this requirement into the law, it ignored the impossibility of 
meeting such a burden.257 Moreover, the intent requirement suggests that 
individuals are responsible for the discriminatory practice, which has at 
least two consequences. First, "blaming" individuals for institutional ra-
cism understandably promotes a perceived need for the allegedly racist in-
dividuals to defend themselves against such charges. Most people probably 
do not think of themselves as racist and certainly would not think of them-
selves as intentionally racist. Rather than being motivated to make individ-
ual contributions to end racial discrimination and promote racial equality, 
individuals who get blamed, however indirectly, for institutional racism 
may be more sympathetic to cries like those of Allan Bakke's of being 
innocent (White) victims in the context of affirmative action policies that 
they believe decrease their own opportunities. Significantly, this shifting of 
blame and responsibility for institutional racism onto individuals also ig-
nores the harm caused by institutional racism,258 which raises the second 
point. 
As Professor john a. powell observed, the emphasis on individual re-
sponsibility obviates any need to inquire into the institutional racism be-
hind the resulting harm.259 Professor powell states, "Current formalist 
legal analysis fails to recognize state action as the culmination and combi-
nation of the policies and actions of school, housing, and other city and 
state officials taken together. This combination causes racial and economic 
254. /d. But see JoNATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 223-29 (1991) (describing 
the inevitable delays in implementing such a policy and suggesting that 23 years after Rodri-
guez "the children of the poorest people in the state of Texas still are waiting for an equal 
chance at education"). 
255. See, e.g., N.J. CaNsT. Art. 8, § 4, <{1 ("The Legislature shall provide for the main-
tenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruc-
tion of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years."); N.H. 
CaNsT. Pt. 2, Art. 83 ("it shall be the duty of the legislators ... , in all future periods of this 
government, to cherish the interest of literature and sciences, and all seminaries and public 
schools . . . "); see also powell, supra note 40, at 761-62. 
256. See generally Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Con-
sciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MicH. L. REv. 953, 961-65 
(1993) (exploring relationship between discriminatory intent requirement and colorblind 
rhetoric). 
257. powell, supra note 40, at 771 ("In addition to disregarding reality, this presump-
tion makes it more difficult for families in poor, segregated neighborhoods and schools to 
tell their stories and to right the wrong of segregation.") (footnote omitted). 
258. See id. at 758 (discussing how urban segregation isolates Blacks not only from 
Whites, but also from quality education, health care, and jobs). 
259. /d. at 768-69. 
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segregation in America's schools and communities."260 As a society com-
mitted to equality, we must accept that there are connections between so-
cioeconomic status and race. If this reality were acknowledged by 
institutions like the Supreme Court, they would be able to examine ques-
tions like educational equality in ways that promote holistic solutions to 
underlying systemic problems. If the Court and others involved in educa-
tion were to acknowledge that poverty and segregation are related, then 
they might also acknowledge that the question of educational equality is 
not one of equal funding oR integration, but rather one of equal funding 
AND integration. Seeing the connection between poverty and racism and 
trying to resolve the whole problem will promote educational and racial 
equality. 
Finally, judges, legislators, policy makers, and others need to foster an 
understanding that the colorblind rhetoric that currently influences at least 
three Supreme Court Justices, some political leaders, and perhaps many 
citizens, is, at best, an ideal at this point in our history. We are not yet at a 
point where color is ignored.261 Holding off promotion of or rejecting the 
colorblind rhetoric altogether and valuing our differences would make it 
easier to understand the continuing need for such things as redistricting 
plans that empower Black voters.262 It also would allow for the continuing 
support of affirmative integration policies. Such policies and efforts toward 
.achieving racial equality have contributed to accomplishing coiiL.-rnon goals 
such as securing the 1996 Summer Olympic Games for the city of Atlanta, 
home of the Civil Rights Movement.263 Moreover, the Atlanta business 
community worked closely with the Olympic Committee to ensure that 
construction contractors, and vending and purchasing contractors had a sig-
nificant minority participation. "As of March, 32 percent of the commit-
tee's $387 million in procurement contracts had been granted to minority 
companies, including 35 percent of the $297 million spent on design and 
construction."264 The effort is seen by the Atlanta community as providing 
260. Id. at 769. 
261. See Gotanda, supra note 147; see also Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, 1990 
DuKE L.J. 758 (exploring the value of critical race theory to legal analysis); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991) (arguing that 
race has a social significance that continues to harm Blacks and other Americans of color, 
and that although the legal strategy of colorblindness achieved victories in the past, it is now 
an impediment to greater racial equality). 
262. The Supreme Court recently struck down redistricting plans of Texas, in Bush v. 
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), and of North Carolina, in Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). 
On a positive note, the Court in Vera pointed out "the irony that the price of imposing a 
principle of colorblindness in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment would be submerg-
ing the votes of those whom the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to 
protect." 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2010 (Souter, J. , dissenting). For a further discussion of the con-
stitutionality of racial gerrymandering and its alternatives, see LANI GurNIER, THE TYR-
ANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994). 
263. Kevin Sack, Atlanta Leaders See Racial Goals as Olympic Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 1996, at AI. 
264. !d. 
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"a lasting legacy of biracial business relationships."265 Sponsoring the 
Olympics boosted our national pride and promoted a sense of national 
community. Just as affirmative integration policies like those in the At-
lanta business community promoted positive race relations, such policies 
also are instrumental in integrating educational institutions where admis-
sions are made by selection committees. 
The list of ideas is infinite and there are many people and institutions 
working toward these and other goals. Notwithstanding these efforts, it is 
easy at times to be discouraged and to wonder if Professor Derrick Bell is 
right that "racism is here to stay."266 Personally, I do not want to agree 
with Professor Bell because it is too painful to think he may be right. Yet a 
White person could not spend a day or a week in the life of a person of 
color without coming to the realization that racism is pervasive, something 
people of color know all too well. I am utterly shocked at some of the 
incidents my daughter has endured. One is so unbelievable that I want to 
share it and hope that it makes some kind of an impression about how 
pernicious racism is. This story also relates to the final specific suggestion I 
want to make in this article about what we can do to begin to dismantle 
racism. 
3. The Value of an Apology as an Equitable Remedy 
On October 13, 1995, my daughter and I were waiting at Boston's Lo-
gan International Airport for a connecting flight. Like any six-year-old, 
she was exploring under seats and checking out the waiting area. While she 
was off getting a drink of water, a White woman set her luggage in the chair 
next to me and went to check in. When she returned to her luggage, she sat 
down to wait for her plane. She had been sitting less than two minutes 
when her flight was called. As she gathered her things, she noticed that her 
purse was missing and frantically asked for help. We looked around for 
about ten seconds, but were unable to find it. She then declared, "I bet 
that Black kid took it." My daughter was the only child and the only Black 
person in the waiting area. I was stunned and immediately responded, "I'm 
sorry, but you are talking about my daughter. My daughter is not a thief. I 
bet you left your bag at the counter." The woman did not say anything to 
me at first, but went to the counter and found her bag. She rushed past me 
to catch her flight and, as she was heading out the door, look backed and 
exclaimed, "It's Friday the 13th. What do you expect?" 
How about an apology?, I thought. This time, fortunately, my daugh-
ter did not hear what was said about her and will not have to carry around 
265. !d. 
266. Derrick Bell, Jr., Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79 (1991). 
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in her memory a stranger's perception of her as a purse thief.267 Some-
times I wonder how parents of children of color survive these kinds of emo-
tional assaults. It is heartbreaking to see your child discriminated against 
over and over again. If mothers, fathers, and other loved ones are con-
stantly fighting back tears, fighting for our children's rights, what must our 
children be feeling? While many parents of color undoubtedly understand 
the pain of racism from a child's perspective because of their own exper-
iences, they must wonder with dismay at how and why the racism persists 
into the childhoods of their own children. How are parents and other con-
cerned people to understand how children can be mistreated? Moreover, if 
my daughter suffers the hurt of racism almost daily just going to her safe, 
middle-class elementary school in a sleepy, university town, imagine how . 
children of color who are struggling with poverty, violence, and neglected 
schools must steel themselves against racism just to get through the day. 
How is any child of color supposed to understand race discrimination? 
How is any White child who witnesses it supposed to understand? 
If the woman in the airport who accused my daughter of being a purse 
thief had apologized to me and acknowledged the harm her racism caused, 
I would have felt better about the incident. If she had not been in a hurry 
to catch her plane, her apology also would have opened up the possibility 
for further discussion between us about race. Chances are good that we 
both would have felt better if that discussion had occurred. In the remain-
der of this article, I want to suggest some ways in which another type of 
apology-made by the Federal Government-could help stimulate a pro-
ductive national conversation about race relations. 
I do not think the government has ever apologized for slavery, the 
continuing effects of slavery, and persistent racial inequality.268 Recently, 
267. When she is old enough to read this, she probably will not be interested enough in 
her mom's work to bother. But if she does read this, she will be old enough to talk about 
what happened. 
268. Our country has struggled with the issue of reparations for slavery for a long time, 
primarily in the context of damage awards. In 1886, Congress actually passed a bill to com-
pensate 4 million former slaves, but the bill was vetoed by President Johnson. Calvin J. 
Allen, The Continuous Quest of African Americans to Obtain Reparations for Slavery, 
NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAo., May/June 1995, at 33. The bill called for confiscation of confeder-
ate property to be used to provide "40 acres and a mule" to each former slave. !d. The 1995 
total value of the "40 acres and a mule" compensation is between $300 and $500 billion. !d. 
This legislation inspired the notable actor, director, and film maker Spike Lee, who often 
deals with race issues in his work, to name his production company, "40 Acres and a Mule" 
Productions. · 
Black plaintiffs have also unsuccessfully sought damage awards for racism since Re-
construction. For example, in the 1915 "Cotton Tax" case, Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 U.S. 
App. D.C. 440, 441 (1916), aff'd, 244 U.S. 643 (1917), plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of 
Treasury for reparations of $68 million, the value of slave labor used to produce cotton that 
the government taxed. Allen, supra, at 33. The case was dismissed by the U.S. District 
Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision. !d. See also Rhonda 
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Black plaintiffs sued the government seeking, among other relief, an offi-
cial apology along these lines.269 The Ninth Circuit dismissed their case 
because the panel of judges said the plaintiffs had not been specific enough 
in their complaint about the wrongs they suffered.270 The Court then went 
on to say that they had no jurisdiction to issue an apology.271 
Black plaintiffs have brought other cases seeking apologies for ra-
cism.272 Whether it is the role of the federal judiciary to issue the apology 
is an interesting legal question only from the standpoint of whether such an 
apology would "speak" for the government. Issuing an apology to victims 
of racism is a modest, but nevertheless powerful and reasonable equitable 
remedy and ought to be within a judge's inherent power. As a matter of 
civility and human kindness, however, how much harm would it do for a 
judge to say that he or she is sorry that the plaintiffs feel wronged, even if 
the judge's apology has to be qualified as unofficial? Cases exist where 
judges express their sympathy with the plaintiffs even though the judges 
V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Repa-
rations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863 (1993) 
(providing a historical overview of Black reparations movement). 
One of the most memorable public demands for reparations since Brown came from 
James Forman in 1969 who interrupted services at New York's Riverside Church to promote 
a "Black Manifesto," calling for churches and synagogues to contribute $500 million for 
reparations to African-Americans for slavery. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr. , Dissection of a 
Dream, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 157 (1974) (reviewing BoRIS BrrrKER, THE CAsE FOR 
BLACK REPARATIONS (1973)). In his book, Professor Bittker concludes that damage 
awards for harm caused by slavery are unrealistic, but he does suggest ways for Blacks to 
recover for more recent injuries, like the continuing segregation following Brown. Magee 
recently criticized Bittker for failing to acknowledge the "considerable moral and emotional 
power from the 'super-wrong' propagated by the institution of slavery, and any presentation 
of the case for reparations which concedes the impracticality of remedying the injury caused 
by slavery has likely dealt itself a near-fatal blow." Magee, supra, at 901 (footnote omitted). 
Professor Mari J. Matsuda has also suggested ways to make restitution for racism in her 
article Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 323 (1987). See also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of 
Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597 (1993). 
An apology can have a healing effect, but, as this brief historical overview shows, it will 
not compensate victims of racism for their harm and thus, it is only the beginning of the 
healing process. 
269. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995). The Cato court, how-
ever, did acknowledge that "discrimination and bigotry of any type is intolerable, and the 
enslavement of Africans by this Country is inexcusable," showing that it had some sympathy 
for the plaintiff's injury, but not enough to issue an apology. Id. 
270. Id. at 1109. 
271. Id. at 1111 (holding "the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate 
forum for this relief'). 
272. See Jenifer Warren, Demanding Repayment For Slavery, L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 1994 
(reporting that with support of the Rev. Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King, "dozens" of 
lawsuits seeking reparations for slavery have been filed, including one (filed by Valena Con-
ley) seeking $100 million in damages and a formal apology from the United States); see also 
Group Asking Reparations for Blacks Meets in Michigan, BALTIMORE SUN, July 24, 1994, at 
3A (reporting that several hundred people attended annual convention for N'COBRA, or 
the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, and that some group members 
"just want a formal apology"). 
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have been unable to give the plaintiffs all they seek. By pretending that we 
(judges and other members of society) do not know what Black plaintiffs 
mean or that we are otherwise powerless to acknowledge their requests 
when they say they want White society to apologize for the harm it has 
done to them is to lose an opportunity to begin healing. As we debate the 
propriety of issuing judicial apologies, we should not let the main point get 
lost: Blacks want and deserve, at a minimum, an apology for slavery and 
for the concomitant persistent racial inequality in society.Z73 
There is precedent set by Congress and the President to apologize on 
behalf of our nation for past racial wrongs of government policy. For ex-
ample, Congress passed legislation in 1988 establishing a $1.25 billion trust 
fund to pay $20,000 in reparations to each of the 120,000 Japanese-Ameri-
cans interned during World War II.Z74 The legislation also called for the 
issuance of "individual apologies" to the victims. At the signing of the bill, 
President Reagan said, "[W]e must recognize that the internment .. was .. a 
mistake.'m5 President Bush also apologized for the internment, stating 
that the government's policy "offends our own principles of justice."276 
There is also precedent by private groups to apologize to Blacks for 
past racist policy. Members of the Southern Baptist Convention passed a 
resolution apologizing to and asking forgiveness of "all African Ameri-
cans" for its racist policy and resolving to "repent of racism of which we 
have been guilty."277 Pope John Paul II has issued several apologies over 
the years for the Catholic Church's role in past racism.278 Ralph Reed, 
273. African-Americans are not alone in their search for an apology for racism. As 
South Africa moved away from Apartheid in the early 1990s, many (including Black leader 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu) called for an apology on behalf of the government from Presi-
dent F. W. de Klerk. Christopher S. Wren, South Africa and Apartheid: No Apologies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, §4, at 2. He was unwilling at that time to apologize for apartheid, 
despite the fact that Afrikaner leaders felt that it was critical in "[restoring] meaningful 
relations between blacks and whites." !d. Some claim that de Klerk feared that an apology 
would cost him politically (by losing white votes) and could lead to calls for the payment of 
reparations to blacks. Id. de Klerk ultimately apologized, which was seen as a necessary 
first step of the healing process. Louis Freedberg, Many Reject Amnesty for Apartheid, 
South Africans Say Healing Takes More than Apologies, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1994, at Al; 
see also 'We are Sorry' About Apartheid, De Klerk Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Oct. 10, 
1992, at A10 ('"For too long we clung to a dream of separated nation-states when it was 
already clear that it could not succeed,' de Klerk said in the conservative central town of 
Wmburg. 'For that we are sorry."'). 
274. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996). 
Blacks have been unsuccessful in winning damage awards for racism. See supra note 268. 
275. Julie Johnson, President Signs Law to Redress Wartime Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 1988, at A16. 
276. See President to Express Regret on Internments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at D20 
(quoting from draft of President Bush's speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor). 
277. Gustav Niebuhr, Baptist Group Votes to Repent for Stand on Slaves, N.Y. TIMEs, 
June 21, 1995, at A2. 
278. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Pope Apologizes to Africans for Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 1985, at A3 ("[apologizing] to black . .<\frica for the involvement of white Christians 
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director of the Christian Coalition, acknowledged that his organization 
must "'make racial conciliation a major priority'" if it is to have a "'mor-
ally resonant voice.' "279 
Following these precedents, the President and Congress could issue an 
apology to Blacks for slavery and for the persistence of pervasive racial 
inequality in American society.28° For example, President Clinton recently 
turned his attention (and that of federal law enforcement officials) to a 
series of arson fires in Southern Black churches.281 President Clinton ac-
knowledged the racial motivation for the fires and "called on the nation to 
'show the forces of hatred they cannot win.' "282 While legislation, backed 
by Congress and the White House (similar to that passed to apologize to 
the Japanese-Americans interned during World War II), seems like the 
most appropriate vehicle for an apology about slavery and the persistence 
of racial inequality, the President seems to have missed an important op-
portunity to take action himself. 
The exact scope of an official government apology might be uncertain 
until it is given careful reflection by top administrators and government 
officials. At a minimum, the apology could express our nation's deep re-
gret and remorse for slavery. Ideally, however, the apology would also in-
clude an expression of regret and remorse over the racial inequality that 
still pervades our society. The purpose of such a broad ranging apology is 
to signal recognition that racial inequality did not end with emancipation 
nor with the demise of Jim Crow segregation. 
in the slave trade"). The Pope has also apologized for other wrongs like religious intoler-
ance, see Celestine Bohlen, Pope Asks Czechs to Forgive Sectarian Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 1995, at A3 ("[A]imed at healing a centuries-old legacy of religious wars and ha-
treds, [Pope] asked forgiveness for the wrongs committed ... against Protestants and people 
of other faiths."), and oppression of women, see Kenneth L. Woodward, Who's Sorry Now?, 
NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995, at 65 ("[Pope apologizes to] 'every woman' in the world ... 
acknowledging that women 'have often been relegated to the margins of society and even 
reduced to servitude ... for this I am truly sorry."'). 
279. Bob Herbert, Burning Their Bridges, TAMPA TRIB., June 21, 1996, at A19. Mr. 
Reed's comments are a reaction to the recent spate of arson fires in southern Black 
churches. 
280. It is important to recognize that other minority groups who have suffered racial 
and ethnic discrimination could also benefit from an official government apology addressing 
the injustices they have faced as well as the inequality that they continue to encounter. I 
have limited my discussion here to the relevance of an apology to African-Americans, pri-
marily because of the stark racial divisiveness that currently exists between Black and White 
Americans. 
281. Todd S. Purdum, President and Governors Confer on Fires, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
1996, at A9. Burning down Black churches is particularly pernicious given the role of the 
church in African-American history and culture that extends beyond religious significance 
into the political, social, and economic realms. For a fuller discussion of the role of the 
church in African-American history and culture, see C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. 
MAMIY A, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990). 
282. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Calls on the Nation to Defy 'Forces of Hatred', N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at B7. 
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Regardless of whether some Americans believe there is a connection 
between slavery and current racial inequality, many sound and positive rea-
sons exist for our legislators and President to issue an official broad ranging 
apology to African-Americans. First, as a society we are at an impasse on 
racial equality issues. This impasse may be partly attributable to confusion 
among Whites, many of whom are people of good will, about the relation-
ship between slavery and continuing racial inequality. This confusion need 
not be resolved in order for an official apology to have value. Indeed, an 
apology might help skeptical Whites recognize dimensions of slavery and 
racial inequality that they had previously ignored, thereby helping White 
and Black Americans move beyond the current impasse toward a more 
constructive conversation about racial equality. 
Whenever people get caught up in arguing who is "right" or who 
speaks the "truth" on a particular issue, communications tend to break 
down to such a point that eventually one side will "stonewall" or just stop 
participating.283 In the context of a marriage, this would spell doom or 
divorce; the parties would go separate ways in order to survive the emo-
tional pain and move on with their lives. In the context of racial relations, 
we cannot afford to get to this point. Yet, many government leaders' deni-
als that race discrimination is a current phenomenon has them on a path of 
disregarding Blacks' concerns. Assuming we want an open dialogue about 
how to achieve healthy race relations, White society has to acknowledge 
that race discrimination is an ongoing problem. 
Second, an official government proclamation apologizing for slavery 
and persistent racial inequality sets a tone for everyone to follow. If Con·-
gress and the President are behind the effort, it will send a message that our 
nation is seriously committed to achieving equality for all people- a princi-
ple that is hard to dispute. Indeed, the government itself might be more 
motivated to adopt policies consistent with its public commitment. In addi-
tion, organizations and individuals who fail to see the value in the Southern 
Baptist Convention's or the Pope's apologies to Blacks may be more will-
ing to follow the lead of the President and Congress. 
Third, if the government acknowledges that race relations need to be 
improved and that White society has to do more toward achieving racial 
equality, then the healing process can begin. Working together maximizes 
the chances for creative and successful solutions. Working together, in and 
of itself, will help bridge the racial divide. For example, the private apology 
283. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 136. 
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from the Southern Baptist Convention to Blacks resulted in commenda-
tions of leadership,284 positive calls for action,285 and hope for future im-
proved race relations.286 
The potential healing effect of an apology for an individual can be 
quite significant. Recently, Margaret Bergmann Lambert received an invi-
tation to be Germany's National Olympic Committee's guest of honor at 
the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.287 The invitation was extended as 
an apology and "form of reparation" for the suffering she endured as a 
result of Nazi German's racist policy to bar Jewish athletes from the 1936 
Olympics in Berlin.288 Ms. Lambert was the favorite for a gold medal in 
the women's high jump, and won the U.S. Championship in that event in 
1937 after immigrating to the United States and vowing she would never 
return to Germany.289 Understandably, being excluded from the Berlin 
Olympics was only part of her anger; she and her family, along with mil-
lions of Jews, suffered because of the terrorism and murders committed by 
the Nazi regime during the Holocaust. So why accept the invitation now 
after she has tried to forget the past? Her presence will be a reminder to 
young people of the anti-semitism and evil of Hitler's Germany, she 
says.290 Equally important, "I thought that going to Atlanta as the guest of 
honor of the German Olympic committee would be good for my mental 
outlook. It will make the ghosts of the past a little less unfriendly."291 Ms. 
Lambert's gracious acceptance of Germany's invitation tells us it is never 
too late to apologize and that an apology is important to the healing 
process. 
Fourth, imagine the profound impact we could have on our children by 
renewing our commitment to achieving racial equality. Perhaps the one 
place where this could best be shown is in our schools for all the reasons 
discussed in this article. We owe each child an opportunity to develop a 
healthy self-esteem. This means instilling in our children a sense of self-
worth and a sense of belonging to a nation that is committed to ensuring 
they succeed.Z92 As today's children become healthy and happy adults, 
they will ensure the success of the next generation. A nation as wealthy as 
ours can afford to feed, house, nurture, and educate all of its children. A 
284. Carl Rowan, Courageous Southern Baptists Deserve Blessing of America, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, June 23, 1995, at 31. 
285. Deborah Mathis, Baptists' Apology is Just a Start, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, June 
25, 1995, at J7. 
286. Baptists' Apology Helps Old Racial Wounds Heal, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., June 22, 
1995, at A10. 
287. Ira Berkow, An Olympic Invitation that is 60 Years Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 
1996, at Al. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at B14. 
292. KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1989). 
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nation as great as ours should care about its children and tend to their 
welfare. 
Finally, an official apology to the Black community is the right thing to 
do. As long as White society denies the pervasive racial inequality in soci-
ety, the racial anger will augment, and the divide will grow. Consistent 
with human nature, anyone who has been wronged feels better just having 
that acknowledged. In fact, without that recognition, healing may be im-
possible or may take much longer than would otherwise be necessary. Ad-
mittedly, more than an apology is needed to repair the damage done to 
Blacks because of racial discrimination. An official apology is merely a 
starting point, but it is an opportune way to renew our commitment to ra-
cial equality and begin racial healing. 
CoNcLusioN 
"When I dream, I dream of growing up to be alive. "293 
We must remain committed to ending racism-we owe it to all of our 
children. We also must remain committed to educating our children be-
cause this may be their best way to avoid the traps that currently pull at 
them and shape many of their lives. We can begin to end racism and also 
help our children stay out of trouble by giving them a quality, integrated 
education and by teaching them emotional intelligence skills. 
I have explored a number of major Supreme Court cases focusing on 
education and have suggested that our commitment as a nation to inte-
grated public schools is waning. Closely related to our declining commit-
ment to integrated schools, is our lack of commitment to providing a 
quality education to all children. Recent cases indicate that the current 
Supreme Court is less committed than was the Brown Court in interpreting 
the equal protection clause in ways that promote racial ~nd educational 
equality. Specifically, the Court requires proof of racial animus in analyz-
ing school policies that have the effect of promoting racial segregation; it 
invalidates affirmative action policies aimed at integrating educational in-
stitutions; it ignores the connection between race and poverty, thereby al-
lowing school financing schemes that allow for gross disparities in 
educational resources between White schools and schools attended primar-
ily by students of color; some Justices have adopted the theory that the 
Constitution is colorblind, thereby ensuring the existing White power struc-
ture and concomitant racial inequality are likely to stay in place; and the 
Court has allowed at least one local government to "buy its way out of" its 
obligation to integrate by spending as much (or even more) on its Black 
schools than it does on its White schools even though the Black students 
293. Oprah Winfrey (quoting young Black girl) (ABC television broadcast, December 
20, 1995). 
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continue to suffer the racial stigma that motivated the Brown Court to or-
der integration of our public schools. 
At present, we are a racially divided nation. We must begin to ac-
knowledge the wounds institutional racism inflicts on people of color and 
the ultimate toll it takes on our political unity. This article explores, 
through the concept of emotional intelligence, several ways in which we 
can better understand some of the dynamics of racism. It offers hope that 
we can break through the current impasse on race relations and renew our 
commitment to achieving racial equality. 
Thus, although the question of how to integrate our public schools is 
not easy to resolve, I suggest that integrating the schools is both necessary 
and essential if we are ever to achieve racial equality. Recent cases in 
which the Court seems to have given up on this goal, then, actually present 
the real challenge to a society that rejected de jure segregation but remains 
segregated as a matter of fact. Getting rid of Jim Crow was the easy part 
for a society committed to racial equality; now we face the tough test: How 
do we move beyond involuntary de facto segregation in an effective way? 
Now is not the time to give up, but rather it is time to join together and give 
true meaning to the concept of racial equality. We owe it to ourselves and 
to our children. 
